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ARTICLES 
The Mischief Rule 
SAMUEL L. BRA y* 
The mischief rule tells an interpreter to read a statute in light of the 
"mischief' or "evil"-the problem that prompted the statute. The mis-
chief rule has been associated with Blackstone's appeal to a statute's 
"reason and spirit" and with Hart-and-Sacks-style purposivism. Justice 
Scalia rejected the mischief rule. But the rule is widely misunderstood, 
both by those inclined to love it and those inclined to hate it. This Article 
reconsiders the mischief rule. It shows that the rule has two enduringly 
useful functions: guiding an interpreter to a stopping point for statutory 
language that can be given a broader or narrower scope, and helping 
the interpreter prevent clever evasions of the statute. The mischief rule 
raises fundamental questions about the relationship of text and context, 
about the construction of ambiguity, and about legal interpretation when 
we are no longer in "the age of statutes." In many of our present inter-
pretive conflicts, the mischief rule offers useful guidance, for textualists 
and purposivists alike. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A Tennessee statute imposed duties on railroad engineers. If a railroad engi-
neer found an animal or obstruction on the tracks, the statute required "the alarm 
whistle to be sounded, and brakes put down, and every possible means employed 
to stop the train and prevent an accident."1 But what counted as an "animal" on 
the tracks? Cows and horses, yes. But what else? Did all the trains in Tennessee 
have to stop for squirrels? 
The stop-the-train case poses difficult questions for some interpretive theories, 
especially textualism. The text does not identify a stopping point in what counts 
as an animal. Nor is there a dictionary definition that will include cows but 
exclude squirrels. Is a textualist interpreter duty bound to say that trains really do 
have to stop for squirrels? 
There is a legal rule that allows the interpreter to escape this impasse. The mis-
chief rule instructs an interpreter to consider the problem to which the statute was 
addressed, and also the way in which the statute is a remedy for that problem.2 
Put another way, the generating problem is taken as part of the context for reading 
the statute. In the real stop-the-train case, the court found the mischief to be (at 
least especially) the problem of train derailments; the court accordingly held that 
three domesticated geese were not "animals" within the meaning of the statute.3 
In the court's view, failing to consider the mischief would have meant that trains 
had to stop even for "[s]nakes, frogs, and fishing worms."4 
This Article reconsiders and reevaluates the mischief rule. It argues that the mis-
chief rule can help an interpreter give a better account of what the legislature has 
1. Nashville & K. R. Co. v. Davis, 78 S.W. 1050, 1050 (Tenn. 1902). 
2. The canonical statement of the rule is in Reydon' s Case (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637; 3 Co. Rep. 7 a 
(Exch.). For its discussion, see infra Section I.A. 
3. Davis, 78 S.W. at 1050. 
4. Id. 
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actually decided. The reason is inherent in how language works: bare words are 
not always enough, for there may be facts an interpreter needs to know to make 
sense of those words. In technical terms, the interpreter needs not only semantics 
but also pragmatics.5 It is therefore no surprise that courts are continually applying 
the mischief rule even without knowing it. Nevertheless, the rule has been widely 
misunderstood. It was celebrated by Hemy Hart and Albert Sacks, who found in it 
the roots of purposivist interpretation,6 and for that very reason it was rejected by 
Justice Scalia. 7 But the story is more complicated and more interesting. 
The recent literature on legal interpretation includes many references to the 
mischief rule, but this Article is the first thorough consideration of it as a principle 
of statutory interpretation. Bill Eskridge considered the rule in a larger analysis of 
statutory interpretation at the American Founding. 8 Peter Strauss discussed 
the rule in his argument that an interpreter should look to a statute's "political 
history."9 John Manning noted "the complex questions surrounding this tradi-
tional tool of construction" and warned of "uncritical application. " 10 Anita 
Krishnakumar found that the Roberts Court is increasingly relying on this 
principle (including in Yates v. United States) in preference to the canon of 
constitutional avoidance, 11 and she has encouraged interpreters to check their 
conclusions about the text against "the background circumstances, often 
referred to as the 'mischief. "' 12 Stephanie Barclay noted conceptual affinities 
between the mischief rule and decisions that interpret statutes not to reach re-
ligious objectors. 13 Andrew Koppelman has written that to exclude something 
from the coverage of a statute if it is outside the mischief is "the most famil-
iar" and "most legitimate" of the "subtractive moves" available to an inter-
preter. 14 And in a work on meta rules for interpretation, Richard Re considers 
the choice that English courts have in deciding between the mischief rule and 
other rules. 15 And yet this scholarship does not explore the mischief rule in 
5. See generally Kent Bach, The Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction: What It Is and Why It Matters, in 
PRAGMATIK: IMPLIKATUREN UND SPRECHAKTE 33 (Eckard Rolf ed., 1997). On tacit domain quantifiers, 
see infra notes 200--03 and accompanying text. 
6. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1144, 1415 (tent. ed. 1958). 
7. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 433-34, 438 (2012). 
8. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial 
Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 990 (2001). 
9. Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and the Congress: Should Judges Disdain Political History?, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 242, 256--61 (1998). 
10. John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 673, 733 n.253 (1997). 
11. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Passive Avoidance, 71 STAN. L. REv. 513,538, 573-77 (2019). 
12. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Backdoor Purposivism, 69 DUKE L.J. 1275, 1347 (2020). 
13. Stephanie H. Barclay, The Historical Origins of Judicial Religious Exemptions, 96 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 55, 113-118 (2020). 
14. Andrew Koppelman, Bostock, LGBT Discrimination, and the Subtractive Moves, 105 MINN. L. 
REV. HEADNOTES 1, 21 (2020). 
15. Richard M. Re, Interpretive Permissions 2-3 (Jan. 12, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author). 
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depth. The most extensive treatment in recent U.S. scholarship is about consti-
tutional interpretation. 16 
What is the mischief rule and what does it do? It directs attention to the gener-
ating problem, which is public and external to the legislature, something that can 
be considered observable in the world. The mischief might be indicated in the 
statute itself or be established by judicial notice, evidence of public debate pre-
ceding enactment, or legislative history. 17 Nevertheless, there is no necessary 
relationship between considering the mischief and consulting legislative history. 
In the years when English courts applied the "Hansard rule," refusing to consider 
debates in Parliament, they nevertheless continued to apply the mischief rule. 18 
The mischief rule serves two functions. First, a stopping-point function: 19 it 
offers a rationale for an interpreter's choice about how broadly to read a term or 
provision in a legal text. Second, a clever-evasion function: it allows an inter-
preter to read a legal text a little more broadly to prevent a clever evasion that 
would perpetuate the mischief. Of these two, the stopping-point function is much 
more common. 
The stopping-point function is useful because any, or at least almost any, legal 
text is susceptible of being read with different degrees of breadth. A famous hy-
pothetical statute of medieval Bologna prohibited shedding blood in the munici-
pal palace. 20 It could be read to prohibit all shedding of blood, including when a 
barber accidentally cuts a man while shaving his face, or it could be read more 
narrowly as prohibiting violent shedding of blood. 21 If the mischief were a recent 
spate of violence in the palace, the interpreter would have a reason to choose the 
narrower interpretation. Conversely, if the mischief lay in a popular belief that 
the presence of any shed blood would make the palace, and thus the city, ritually 
unclean, the mischief rule would suggest a different scope; then the case of the 
maladroit barber would be covered. This is the stopping-point function of the 
mischief rule: it gives the interpreter a reason to stop here instead of going further 
(or stopping short). 
The mischief rule might lead an interpreter to choose a broader or narrower 
scope. But as time passes, and as a statute is pressed into service to answer ques-
tions never dreamed of at the time of its enactment, the mischief rule will tend to 
serve this stopping-point function by offering a narrower reading of the statute. In 
16. See generally Daniel Frost, Getting into Mischief: On What It Means to Appeal to the U.S. 
Constitution, 28 INT'L J. SEMIOTICS L. 267 (2015). 
17. See infra Section 11.B. 
18. See Stefan Vogenauer, A Retreat from Pepper v. Hart?: A Reply to Lord Steyn, 25 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 629,630 (2005). This distinction is recognized in FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615,638 n.8 
(1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), albeit with overstatement regarding the "classical English approach" 
on legislative history. On the complexity of the English tradition, see generally John J. Magyar, 
Debunking Millar v. Taylor: The History of the Prohibition of Legislative History, 41 STATUTE L. REv. 
32 (2020). 
19. I have borrowed the name from Richard Re. 
20. I am following the version in R. H. Helmholz, The Myth of Magna Carta Revisited, 94 N.C. L. 
REV. 1475, 1482 (2016). 
21. See id. 
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other words, it will encourage the court not to update the statute, and to leave to 
the legislature the task of passing a new bill to address a new situation. By con-
trast, the clever-evasion function-which is rarer-typically guides the inter-
preter to choose a modestly broader scope for the statute. 22 
Consider three recent examples of the stopping-point function. First, CSX 
Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Department of Revenue is a dispute that made 
two trips to the U.S. Supreme Court. 23 A federal statute prohibited discriminatory 
state taxes on interstate railroads, and the first three provisions of the statute ex-
plicitly indicated that the relevant comparison was to general commercial 
and industrial taxpayers. 24 The fourth provision of the statute did not have 
that explicit comparator, and referred simply to "another tax that discrimi-
nates against a rail carrier."25 Should the fourth provision be given a nar-
rower interpretation-discrimination relative to general commercial and 
industrial taxpayers? Or should it be given a broader reading-discrimina-
tion relative to any taxpayers? In both cases, a majority of the Justices chose 
the broader reading, and the authors of the majority opinions (Justices 
Kagan and Scalia) made standard textualist moves. 26 In both cases, Justice 
Thomas dissented (joined by Justice Ginsburg), arguing among other things 
that it was important to adopt the narrower reading so the fourth provision 
would have "a reach consistent with the problem the statute addressed." 27 
Second, in Yates v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a provi-
sion in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that makes it a federal crime to destroy, conceal, 
or falsify "any record, document, or tangible object."28 This Act was famously 
passed in response to several major corporate and accounting scandals. But did 
the Act apply if a commercial fisherman was caught catching undersized grouper, 
and tried to evade prosecution by having the undersized fish thrown overboard? 
No, said the Court, because a fish did not count as a "tangible object" within the 
meaning of the statute. 29 The plurality opinion of Justice Ginsburg repeatedly 
hinted at the mischief to which this provision in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was 
22. See infra Section III.B. 
23. Ala. Dep't of Revenue v. CSX Transp., Inc. (CSX JI), 135 S. Ct. 1136 (2015); CSX Transp., Inc. 
v. Ala. Dep't of Revenue (CSX I), 562 U.S. 277 (2011). 
24. CSX II, 135 S. Ct. at 1140-41. 
25. Id. at 1141 (quoting and analyzing 49 U.S.C. § 11501(b)(4) (2012)). 
26. See CSX II, 135 S. Ct. at 1141, 1143, 1144 (Scalia, J.) ("Subsection (b)(4) contains no such 
limitation .... This is not our concept of fidelity to a statute's text. ... If the task of determining when 
that is so is 'Sisyphean,' ... it is a Sisyphean task that the statute imposes."); CSX I, 562 U.S. at 296 
(Kagan, J.) (rejecting a narrow reading of the fourth provision as nothing more than "Alabama's 
preference for symmetry" and stating "the choice is not ours to make" because "Congress wrote the 
statute it wrote"). 
27. CSX I, 562 U.S. at 298, 301 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing the problem as "property taxes 
that soaked the railroads"); see CSX II, 135 S. Ct. at 1144-45 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
28. 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1078 (2015) (quoting and analyzing 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012)). 
29. See id. at 1081. 
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directed.30 Although Justice Ginsburg only said that she was "[m]indful" of the 
problem preceding the statute, 31 the mischief rule supported her stopping point. 
Third, consider Zarda v. Altitude Express, Jnc. 32 The Second Circuit, sitting en 
bane, held that Title VII's prohibition on discrimination on the basis of "sex" 
includes within its reach discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 33 Judge 
Lynch dissented, appealing to among other things the "political and social his-
tory" that was the context for Title VIl,34 and his dissent shows a strong grasp and 
endorsement of the mischiefrule.35 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court affirmed the 
Second Circuit, reading "sex" broadly, and ignoring the mischief because "only 
the words on the page constitute the law adopted by Congress and approved by 
the President."36 
The mischief rule offers the organizing and justificatory principle for what 
Justice Thomas in CSX, Justice Ginsburg in Yates, and Judge Lynch in Zarda all 
sensed was the right reading. Yet it is worth noting that in none of these cases did 
a majority of the Supreme Court apply the mischief rule, and the discussion of the 
rule has ebbed in American legal scholarship. Why? 
The most likely answer is simply that the rule is thought to be equivalent to 
purposivism. The distinction between mischief and purpose is worked out in 
more detail below,37 but here consider a simple theory of action. There are certain 
things that spur us to consider acting. Spurred on, we act. But we do so not like a 
coracle, buffeted by the waves, rudderless and unpaddled. Instead, we have rea-
sons for our actions. But the expression, "such and such was my reason for act-
ing" is ambiguous. It could refer to the initial cause, the spur to acting. Or it could 
refer to the aim ( or ultimate aim) that I had for acting. Both are, in a sense, my 
"reason." Yet they can be assigned different locations in this sentence: "Because 
of a, the action b, so that c." That ambiguity in my "reason" is precisely why the 
30. Id. at 1079 (indicating that§ 1519 has a "financial-fraud mooring" and that in the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, "Congress trained its attention on corporate and accounting deception and cover-ups"); id. at 1080 
(recognizing § 1519 as part of a law that "target[ s] corporate fraud"); id. at 1081 (noting the statute was 
"prompted by the exposure of Emon's massive accounting fraud," describing § 1519 as "cur[ing] a 
conspicuous omission," and that "[i]n the Government's view,§ 1519 extends beyond the principal evil 
motivating its passage"). 
31. See id. at 1079. But cf Krishnakumar, supra note 11, at 538-40 (concluding that Justice 
Gins burg's opinion "relied heavily" on the mischief rule). 
32. 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018), aff d, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). 
33. Id. at 131. 
34. See id. at 144-45 (Lynch, J., dissenting) (alteration in original). 
35. See id. at 143 ("Legislation is adopted in response to perceived social problems, and legislators 
adopt the language that they do to address a social evil or accomplish a desirable goal. The words of the 
statute take meaning from that purpose, and the principles it adopts must be read in light of the problem 
it was enacted to address."). For contrary arguments about the scope of Title VII's prohibition of 
employment discrimination on the basis of "sex," see generally William N. Eskridge Jr., Title VII' s 
Statutory History and the Sex Discrimination Argument for LGBT Workplace Protections, 127 YALE L. 
J. 322 (2017); Koppelman, supra note 14. 
36. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738 ("If judges could add to, remodel, update, or detract from old 
statutory terms inspired only by extratextual sources and our own imaginations, we would risk amending 
statutes outside the legislative process reserved for the people's representatives."). 
37. See infra Section 11.C. 
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difference between mischief and purpose is usually obscured. The mischief is the 
spur, the "because of." More technically, for law, the mischief is the problem that 
precedes the statute and the legal deficiency that allowed it; the mischief is what 
the statute responds to. The purpose imputed to the legislature is an aim going 
forward. 38 
There will be instances of convergence between the mischief and the purpose, 
instances in which the purpose is no more than the removal of the mischief 
("because of a, the statute b, so that not a"). Yet there will often be more than that 
mere convergence; the imputable purpose will often be an extrapolation from the 
evil to something more abstract. Hart and Sacks are themselves quite clear on this 
point. They add a crucial step: the interpreter starts with the mischief and then 
from it infers "the general purpose."39 That step is significant. It makes the mis-
chief grist for the mill of purpose. That additional level of abstraction is indeed 
valuable if a judge sees her role as faithfully interpreting a statute in a way that 
fulfills the legislature's policy aims-a standard purposivist conception. But it 
would be an error if a judge sees her role as faithfully interpreting a statute so as 
to carry out the policy embodied in the statute itself-a standard textualist 
conception. 40 
Because this Article attempts to give the mischief rule a discrete existence, it is 
of course true that I am sharpening the contrasts between the mischief and other 
concepts, including purpose and the equity of the statute. In early modern 
England these concepts seem to have been entirely overlapping, and even though 
one can always find cases using the terms interchangeably, over time the concepts 
somewhat diverged. To a degree not appreciated in much of the literature on stat-
utory interpretation, the purpose and the equity of the statute developed into 
roomier, more expansive concepts, while the mischief stayed narrower and more 
grounded.41 
What is at issue is not mere legal taxonomy, but rather a critical question about 
the role of context in legal interpretation. Statutory interpreters of all stripes say 
that context is important, but textualists, especially, will sometimes in practice 
limit the relevant context to laws-that is, other provisions of the same statute, 
other statutes, and background principles oflaw. This Article argues for a broader 
understanding of context that includes the setting of legal enactments, one aspect 
of which is the mischief. Consider three implications of taking the mischief as 
part of context. 
First, there is less pressure on the statutory language. Language never 
fully expresses intention, and the inadequacy of legal language has long been 
38. I am using purpose in the sense of a general aim imputed to Congress. On legislative intent, see 
infra notes 163--65 and accompanying text. 
39. See HART, JR. & SACKS, supra note 6, at 1415-16. For discussion, see infra Section LC. 
40. See generally John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 70 (2006). 
41. On purpose, see infra Section 11.C. On the equity of the statute, see infra note 95. 
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recognized.42 That inadequacy is partially ameliorated by the mischief rule's 
stopping-point and clever-evasion functions. Both offer a certain kind of solace 
to the legislator. One offers some assurance that her decision today on x will not 
be read as a decision tomorrow on y. The other offers some assurance to the legis-
lator that her statute will not be circumvented by clever tricks. 
Second, there is less surprise and more notice. The functions of the mischief 
rule allow-and indeed require-judgment, characterization, and subjectivity on 
the part of the interpreter. Like other elements of context, the mischief rule does 
not reduce discretion; it does not exclude interpretive options and it may even 
expand them. 43 But if the interpreter considers the mischief as part of the context 
for the statute, the enacting legislature is less likely to be surprised by the effect 
given to its work. In CSX, Yates, and Zarda, for example, the application of the 
mischief rule would arguably make the reach of the statute less surprising-not 
just to the enacting Congress, but also to a reasonable reader at the time of enact-
ment. Although the optimal amount of surprise for the enacting legislature and 
the reasonable contemporaneous reader is not zero, it is probably not massive.44 
And the mischief rule might keep the subsequent surprises smaller than they oth-
erwise would be. 
Finally, thinking about the mischief as part of context highlights a pivotal step 
in legal interpretation: the construction of ambiguity or non-ambiguity.45 Once 
the interpreter has determined that a text is ambiguous, a host of canons and inter-
pretive considerations come into play. Should the mischief rule be considered 
one of them? Or should it be part of the conscientious interpreter's "initial read-
ing," which might determine whether the text is ambiguous? 
An example of why this choice matters is Bond v. United States, in which the 
majority opinion of Chief Justice Roberts is pervaded by an argument that 
the statute (the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998), 
when read in the context from which it arose, was "about" something.46 That 
knowledge of what the statute was about-its mischief-led the Court to treat as 
42. E.g., 2 ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1729, 1795-96 
(Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984); see also FELIX FRANKFURTER, SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE READING OF 
STATUTES 16 (1947) (recognizing "the shorthand nature oflanguage"). 
43. On the relationship between the mischief and discretion, see infra note 111 and accompanying 
text. 
44. Cf Caleb Nelson, A Response to Professor Manning, 91 VA. L. REv. 451, 454 (2005) ("Other things 
being equal, then, interpretive methods that identify legal directives consistent with the ones legislators 
thought they were establishing should be preferred to interpretive methods that systematically produce legal 
directives contrary to the ones legislators thought they were establishing."). 
45. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REv. 2118, 2118 (2016) 
(reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)) (calling the "initial clarity versus ambiguity 
decision" the "primary problem" in statutory interpretation); Adam M. Samalra, If the Text Is Clear-Lexical 
Ordering in Statutory Interpretation, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 155 (2018) (demonstrating the prevalence of 
lexical ordering in statutory interpretation and exploring its trade-offs); see also Richard M. Re, Clarity 
Doctrines, 86 U. CHI. L. REv. 1497 (2019) (analyzing the concept of"legal clarity"). 
46. 572 U.S. 844, 856 (2014) ("But even with its broadly worded definitions, we have doubts that a 
treaty about chemical weapons has anything to do with Bond's conduct."); id. at 860 (considering "the 
context from which the statute arose-a treaty about chemical warfare and terrorism"); id. at 866 
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ambiguous its definition of "chemical weapon," which if taken literally would 
have been extremely broad.47 In a separate opinion, Justice Scalia refused to read 
the text in light of the concerns that led to its enactment, and so found no ambigu-
ity.48 To put his critique in a pointed form, we could say he thought the majority 
was placing the text on a Procrustean bed, tightening the text to align with the 
mischief. But that critique depends on the assumption that the text is logically 
prior to its context, as if it should be ( or even could be) read without a context. 49 
To the contrary, reading the text in its legal and temporal context is not an act of 
violence; it is a step toward understanding.5° Context helps the interpreter see that 
there is a choice about the scope of the statute, and it guides the choice. 51 
The mischief rule is simply a legal instantiation of a common sense point about 
all interpretation. To understand statement x, an interpreter wants to know its set-
ting. To understand a line of dialogue, it is helpful to know the preceding line of 
dialogue. It is also helpful to know the situation in which the characters find 
themselves, to know whether this line was spoken by a character in response to 
seeing a live shark or a rubber duck. Although the mischief rule has distinctive 
qualities that are relevant for law, the underlying intuition that context matters 
(concluding that "the context from which the statute arose demonstrates a much more limited 
prohibition was intended"). 
47. See id. at 866. Richard Re recognizes that Bond and Yates used the same analysis both to identify 
and to resolve the textual ambiguity. See Richard M. Re, The New Holy Trinity, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 407, 
409-13 (2015). Our readings differ because I emphasize the mischief while he characterizes both cases 
as purposivist, lumping them with King v. Burwell. Id. at 413-15. On King v. Burwell, see infra note 
192. Ryan Doerfler understands Bond as centrally about the "class of cases the statute excluded 
implicitly." See Ryan D. Doerfler, High-Stakes Interpretation, 116 MICH. L. REv. 523, 554-55 (2018). 
He criticizes Bond for failing to offer "a plausible linguistic story of implicit exclusion." Id. at 555. I 
think the mischief generates such a story. 
48. See Bond, 572 U.S. at 867-68, 873 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Neal Kumar Katya! & 
Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. 2109, 2150-52 (2015) (agreeing with Justice Scalia that "[f]rom a textualist standpoint ... Bond is 
hard to defend"). For further discussion of Bond, see infra notes 170--75 and accompanying text. 
49. See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020) (stating that "only the words on 
the page constitute the law" and contrasting them with "extratextual sources and [judges'] own 
imaginations"). 
50. See Ryan D. Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L.J. 979, 991-94, 
997-98 (2017); Christopher R. Green, Loyal Denominatorism and the Fourteenth Amendment: 
Normative Defense and Implications, 13 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 167, 171 (2017) ("[T]he text 
only expresses meaning in a context, and that context supplies implicit domain limitations."); Patricia 
M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 
IOWA L. REV. 195, 199 (1983) ("In the context of the statute, other related statutes, or the problems 
giving rise to the statute, words may be capable of many different meanings."). 
51. This is a well-trod path in constitutional interpretation. E.g., Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 
U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247-50 (1833) (relying on legal and temporal context). Nevertheless, there are reasons 
to distinguish the Constitution. Knowing the mischief might be more necessary, given the spare text of 
the Constitution. Or it might have less weight because the Constitution is meant to endure longer than a 
statute. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 165 (2d Cir. 2018) (Lynch, J., dissenting), 
aff d, Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1731. On constitutional provisions and their "paradigm cases," see generally 
Jed Rubenfeld, The Paradigm-Case Method, 115 YALE L.J. 1977 (2006). 
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will persist as long as human beings use and make sense of language. 52 It is there-
fore no surprise that even as the concept of the mischief has receded from U.S. 
legal scholarship, the basic intuition persists in judicial interpretation, even 
though it is insufficiently developed and inadequately understood. 
I. EPISODES IN THE RECEPTION OF THE MISCHIEF RULE 
There is a conventional narrative about statutory interpretation, which goes 
like this: the dominant approach in the mid- to late-twentieth century,53 the pur-
posive approach elaborated by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, was already estab-
lished in the time of Elizabeth I by Reydon' s Case. 54 That case urged judges to 
identify the "mischief' to which the statute was directed, and then to interpret the 
statute to advance the drafters' purposes.55 The mischief rule was endorsed by 
William Blackstone, who equated it with interpreting a statute in light of its "rea-
son and spirit. "56 And so there is a direct line from the sixteenth century to the 
twentieth century, and now to the twenty-first. 57 
Yet the conventional narrative is subject to doubt. Here is the kernel of truth: 
Reydon' s Case did endorse judicial consideration of the "mischief." But there is 
no straight line in the reception of that idea. This Part introduces Reydon' s Case 
52. See infra notes 200-03 and accompanying text (discussing context, and especially tacit domain 
quantifiers). 
53. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 28 (1988) 
(referring to Hart and Sacks' purposivism as having "three decades of near hegemony" before the 
textualist resurgence). 
54. (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637; 3 Co. Rep. 7 a (Exch.). 
55. Id. at 638, 3 Co. Rep. 7 b. 
56. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 61 (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press 1765). 
57. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 31 (2014) ("This [purposive] approach finds 
lineage in the sixteenth-century English decision Reydon' s Case."); William S. Blatt, Interpretive 
Communities: The Missing Element in Statutory Interpretation, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 629, 637 (2001) 
("Scholars searching for objective purpose assume that the legislature systematically pursues the 
common good, an assumption incorporated in the rule in Reydon' s Case." (footnote omitted)); Anuj C. 
Desai, The Dilemma of Interstatutory Interpretation, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 177, 251 (2020) 
("Purposivism has its roots in the so-called 'mischief rule,' dating back at least to Reydon' s Case in 
1584."); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 365, 392-93 
(1990); Elizabeth Garrett, Legislation and Statutory Interpretation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW 
AND Pouncs 360, 369 (Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel Kelemen & Gregory A. Caldeira eds., 2008) 
("The third foundational theory is purposivism, which has its roots in the 'mischief rule' articulated in 
Reydon' s Case (1584)."); Michael P. Healy, Legislative Intent and Statutory Interpretation in England 
and the United States: An Assessment of the Impact of Pepper v. Hart, 35 STAN. J. INT'L L. 231, 235 
(1999); John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 119 n.35 ("The leading 
English precedent for purposivism is Reydon' s Case."); Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the 
Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. Cm. L. REV. 263, 265 n.6 (1982) ("For a modem 
statement of the theory of legislation implicit in Reydon' s Case, see H. HART & A. SACKS .... "); Philip 
Sales, Legislative Intention, Interpretation, and the Principle of Legality, 40 STATUTE L. REv. 53, 56 & 
n.9 (2019); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509,532 (1988); Strauss, supra note 9, at 256, 
265 ("Purposive interpretation traces its roots to Reydon' s Case."). But see L.H. LaRue, Statutory 
Interpretation: Lord Coke Revisited, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 733, 745 n.34 (1987) (cautioning against Hart 
and Sacks' interpretation of H eydon' s Case "to say that a judge should ascertain the purpose underlying 
the statute and then should apply the statute so as to advance that purpose"). 
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and then considers three moments of reception of the mischief rule: Blackstone, 
Hart and Sacks, and Scalia. Blackstone offers a conventional summary of the mis-
chief rule; he never equates it with finding the "reason and spirit" of the law. Hart 
and Sacks make the mischief rule central to a judge's inference of purpose, and 
their use of the rule is fundamentally transformative. And Scalia conflates the 
mischief rule with purposivism and rejects both, perhaps as a way to wall off an 
avenue by which legislative history might enter the interpretive process. 
This Part is preliminary and explanatory. It is not so much an explanation of 
the mischief rule and how it works (for that, see Parts II and III), as it is an expla-
nation for the rule's shape-shifting quality in legal literature. The mischief rule is 
misunderstood and now neglected, though not because anything has changed 
about the basic intuition that a text should be read in context, including in its tem-
poral context. Rather, as the following discussion will show, participants in vari-
ous debates over statutory interpretation have found it useful to be silent about 
the mischief rule or to treat it as equivalent to purposivism. For those who 
embrace purposivism, it seemed unnecessary, something that could be deleted 
with a parsimony of concepts. For those who criticize purposivism, especially 
textualists, the equation of mischief and purpose has obscured an important as-
pect of legal interpretation. 
A. HEYDON' S CASE 
The canonical authority for the mischief rule is Reydon' s Case, a decision of 
the Court of Exchequer in 1584.58 That case is not the origin of the use of the mis-
chief in statutory interpretation, for the idea is certainly older and was a staple of 
English legal education.59 Nevertheless, many interpreters have been drawn to 
the crisply stated propositions that are attributed to Chief Baron Manwood in Sir 
Edward Coke's printed report60 : 
58. 76 Eng. Rep. at 637; 3 Co. Rep. 7 a. The report is reprinted with brief editorial connnents in 1 
THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 78 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003). 
59. By the late Middle Ages, English statutes were understood as being "designed expressly to 
eradicate mischief." NORMAN DOE, FUNDAMENTAL AUTHORITY IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLISH LAW 156 
(1990). There were significant changes from the late Middle Ages to the early modem period in the 
conception of a statute and its relationship to the connnon law, to legislative authority, and to the 
judicial task. See generally A DISCOURSE UPON THE EXPOSICION & UNDERSTANDING£ OF STATUTES WITH 
SIR THOMAS EGERTON'S ADDITIONS 3-100 (Samuel E. Thome ed., 1942) [hereinafter DISCOURSE UPON 
THE EXPOSICION & UNDERSTANDING£ OF STATUTES]. Yet already by the end of the fifteenth century, in 
the inns of court a "reader was expected to explain the 'remedy' by identifying the 'mischief' before the 
statute." 6 JOHN BAKER, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 1483-1558, at 22 (2003) 
[hereinafter 6 BAKER, OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND]; see also JOHN BAKER, THE 
REINVENTION OF MAGNA CARTA 1216-1616, at 222 (2017) [hereinafter BAKER, REINVENTION OF 
MAGNA CARTA] (noting, as of the late sixteenth century, that "[i]t had long been the practice for readers 
in the inns of court to begin their exposition of a statute by offering a historical explanation of the 
mischief at which it was aimed"). 
60. At the time of Reydon' s Case, Coke was a lawyer of increasing prominence; it would be another 
twenty-two years before he became a judge. Coke's manuscript report is apparently much shorter, and in 
it Chief Baron Manwood' s main point is that judges should consider the mischief instead of considering 
whether the statute enlarged or restricted the connnon law. 
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[F]or the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or 
beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law,) four things are to be 
discerned and considered:-
1 st. What was the common law before the making of the Act. 
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not 
provide. 
3rd[.] What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the dis-
ease of the commonwealth. 
And, 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the Judges is 
always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance 
the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of 
the mischief, and pro privato commodo [ which translates to for private bene-
fit], and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true 
intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico [ which translates to for the 
public good].61 
To a reader now, these phrases-"the true reason," "according to the true intent 
of the makers," "add force and life to the cure"-may seem like an ambitious 
charter for purposive interpretation. Yet far from being a prophetic intervention 
into debates today about statutory interpretation, Reydon' s Case is a product of 
its time. 62 The judges and lawyers of 1584 were familiar with the idea of the "true 
61. Reydon' s Case, 76 Eng. Rep. at 638, 3 Co. Rep. 7 b (enumeration omitted). The factual and legal 
milieu of the case is complicated, but the gist is that the Court of Exchequer, interpreting one of the 
Hemician statutes related to the dissolution of the monasteries, read a protection for "any estate or 
interest for life, year or years" as encompassing copyhold tenure (that is, tenure according to manorial 
custom). See id. That has understandably been read as a decision to expand the reach of the statute. But 
by the time of Reydon' s Case, the monasteries had been dissolved for more than four decades; there was 
no need to read the statute broadly to prevent clever evasions. By finding the Wares' copyhold tenure to 
be within the protections of the statute, the court was recognizing the doctrinal evolution of copyhold in 
the intervening decades and assimilating copyhold, at least in this respect, to freehold. On that doctrinal 
evolution, see generally 6 BAKER, OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 59, at 644-
50; and CHARLES MONTGOMERY GRAY, COPYHOLD, EQUITY, AND THE COMMON LAW (1963). This 
reading makes sense of the less famous rule of Reydon' s Case, which lays out presumptions for the 
interaction of copyhold and statutes. See 76 Eng. Rep. at 642, 3 Co. Rep. 9 a; see also 7 W. S. 
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 301-04 (1926). Two decades before Reydon's Case, the 
same result had already been reached by two judges of the Court of Common Pleas. See GRAY, supra, at 
201 n.19. That fact reinforces the idea that Reydon' s Case was not so much a new broadening of the 
statute as it was a judicial recognition of a doctrinal reshuffling that had already occurred. 
62. By the sixteenth century, statutory interpretation had become stricter. See 6 BAKER, OXFORD 
HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 59, at 76-81; DISCOURSE UPON THE EXPOSICION & 
UNDERSTANDING£ OF STATUTES, supra note 59, at 42-47; 1 REPORTS FROM THE LOST NOTEBOOKS OF 
SIR JAMES DYER, at lix-lxi (J.H. Baker ed., 1994). But cf THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE 
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 333-35 (The Lawbook Exch., 5th ed. 2001) (1956) (asserting that "by 
the reign of Elizabeth ... many lawyers ... gloried in the liberty which the courts enjoyed in playing 
fast and loose with statutes"); WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY 
OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 11-19 (1999) (emphasizing freedom and discretion in judges' 
"equitable interpretation" of statutes in early modem England). 
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intent of the makers," but they did not understand this to require a search for the 
subjective intent of members of Parliament. Rather, they recognized it could be 
"a kind of fiction, a constructive intention to be gathered from the wording."63 
Seen in this light, the four enumerated points in Reydon' s Case are more mod-
est than they are often read to be by modern interpreters. Collectively, these 
points suggest that the interpreter should consider four things: (1) the old law; 
(2) the defect in the old law; (3) the new law; and (4) how the new law connects 
to the defect in the old law. In itself, this is not a manifesto for purposivism. It is 
an insistence that statutes are not to be read "in abstract, in vacuo."64 Faced with 
options and ambiguities, judges have guidance on how to resolve them: read the 
statute in light of the mischief, and as a remedy for the mischief. 65 
The mischief rule has had a long career. Although three episodes of recep-
tion will be discussed momentarily, it is worth noting that the rule is consid-
ered part of the law of interpretation. 66 It has often been used by federal and 
state courts, 67 and in some states it is codified. 68 It is intuitive for legislative 
63. 6 BAKER, OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 59, at 79-80. Baker's point is 
about "outsiders" and "later generations," not contemporary expositors who knew the legislative 
process, though he goes on to show Elizabethan recognition that "[l]egislative intention is a fiction in 
any case, since a collective body does not have a mind." Id. 
64. S. E. Thome, The Equity of a Statute and Heydon's Case, 31 ILL L. REV. 202, 215 (1936); see 
also LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 83 (rev. ed. 1969) (drawing attention to "the central truth 
of the Resolution in Heydon's Case, namely, that to understand a law you must understand 'the disease 
of the commonwealth' it was appointed to cure"). On the idea that the mischief rule directs the 
interpreter to read the statute in line with the common law, where possible, see infra note 238. 
65. See EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; OR, A 
COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON, reprinted in 2 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD 
COKE 742 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003) (discussing the mischief). 
66. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 45 (1950) ("It is the plain duty of the courts, 
regardless of their views of the wisdom or policy of the Act, to construe this remedial legislation to 
eliminate, so far as its text permits, the practices it condenms."); Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the 
Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 345 (2010). For two views of the law of interpretation, 
compare William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079 
(2017), with Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as "Law" and the 
Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898 (2011), and Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory 
Interpretation: Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARYL. REV. 753 (2013). 
67. E.g., Bd. of Supervisors v. King Land Corp., 380 S.E.2d 895, 897-98 (Va. 1989); State v. 
Campbell, 429 A.2d 960, 962-63 (Conn. 1980). For disagreement about the mischief rule, see In re 
House of Representatives Request for Advisory Op. Regarding Constitutionality of2018 PA 368 & 369, 
936 N.W.2d 241, 253 (Mich. 2019) (Clement, J., concurring) (considering the mischief as part of the 
statute's historical context); id. at 266-67 (Markman, J., dissenting) ( equating the mischief with purpose 
and rejecting it); id. at 275-78 (Viviano, J., dissenting) (rejecting the mischief rule). 
68. E.g., GA. CODE ANN.§ 1-3-1 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis. Sess.) ("In all interpretations 
of statutes, the courts shall look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly, keeping in view at 
all times the old law, the evil, and the remedy."); N.Y. STAT. LAW§ 95 (McKinney, Westlaw through 
2019) ("The courts in construing a statute should consider the mischief sought to be remedied by the 
new legislation, and they should construe the act in question so as to suppress the evil and advance the 
remedy."); 1 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Act 79) ("When 
the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by 
considering, among other matters[,] ... [t]he mischief to be remedied."); see also N. X-Ray Co. v. State, 
542 N.W.2d 733, 736 (N.D. 1996) (construing a state statute as codifying the mischief rule). 
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drafters.69 It is intuitive for Executive Branch officials.70 And it is intuitive for 
judges.71 CSX, Yates, Zarda, and Bond all show that sometimes judges know the 
mischief matters. 
B. BLACKSTONE'S CONVENTIONALITY 
William Blackstone discusses general principles of legal interpretation in 
Section 2 of the introduction to his Commentaries on the Laws of England. In 
Section 3 he discusses the interpretation of English statutes, and only here-not 
in his general discussion----does he address the mischief rule.72 This pattern of 
usage is revealing for the relationship of the mischief rule to other interpretive 
considerations. 
To begin with, Blackstone's presentation of the mischief rule in Section 3 is 
straightforward, partly quoting from and partly glossing Reydon' s Case: 
There are three points to be considered in the construction of all remedial stat-
utes; the old law, the mischief, and the remedy: that is, how the common law 
stood at the making of the act; what the mischief was, for which the common 
law did not provide; and what remedy the parliament hath provided to cure 
this mischief. And it is the business of the judges so to construe the act, as to 
suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.73 
In Section 2, where Blackstone treats general principles of legal interpretation, 
he offers five "signs."74 These are "the words, the context, the subject matter, the 
effects and consequence, [and] the spirit and reason of the law."75 The absence of 
any reference to the mischief has been missed by some commentators, however, 
who have treated Blackstone's discussion of "the spirit and reason of the law" as 
if it were a discussion of the mischief rule. 76 
69. See LAWRENCE E. FILSON & SANDRA L. STROKOFF, THE LEGISLATIVE DRAFTER'S DESK 
REFERENCE 31 (2d ed. 2008) ("The sponsor simply says in effect 'here is my problem-fix it."'). 
70. See, e.g., Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. 
7, 16 (2011) (statement of Hon. Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State) (defending a narrow 
reading of hostilities in the War Powers Resolution in part because of the context in which it arose: "The 
Congress that passed the resolution in [1973] had just been through a long, major, and searing war in 
Vietnam"). 
71. See Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of 
Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1327 (2018). 
72. Cf JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES: A CRITICISM OF WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 99-100 (Charles Warren Everett ed., 
Scientia Verlag Aalen 1976) (1928) (recognizing that Blackstone's general rules of interpretation are 
distinct from his more specific rules for statutes). 
73. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at 87. 
74. Id. at 59. On Blackstone's rules for statutory interpretation, see generally John V. Orth, 
Blackstone's Rules on the Construction of Statutes, in BLACKSTONE AND Hrs COMMENTARIES: 
BIOGRAPHY, LAW, HISTORY 79 (Wilfrid Prest ed., 2009). 
75. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at 59. 
76. E.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown/deal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1523-24 
& n.46 (1998) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW (1997)) (equating "considering the reason and spirit" with the "mischief rule"); cf William S. 
Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 
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But the relationship between the mischief rule and Blackstone's signs is more 
complicated. For one thing, the mischief rule cuts across several of the signs. For 
example, Blackstone's description of the subject matter could also fit the mis-
chief: what was "in the eye of the legislator," the end toward which "all his 
expressions [are] directed."77 Also fitting the mischief is part of Blackstone's 
description of the reason and spirit, for both can be characterized as the "cause 
which moved the legislator to enact" the law.78 Note, however, that his illustra-
tion for reason and spirit moves beyond the mischief, because it emphasizes not a 
problem precedent as much as an affirmative legislative aim.79 
What explains Blackstone's omission of the mischief rule in his account of the 
general principles of legal interpretation? Two explanations are possible, but 
each winds up having a similar implication. 
One explanation is that Blackstone may have considered the mischief rule to 
be peculiar to English law. He may have thought of it as a rule specific to the rela-
tionship between statutes and the common law. It would then naturally come up 
in his discussion of English law, not in his discussion of legal interpretation more 
generally. 
804 (1985) (recognizing that Blackstone's "reason and spirit" and the mischief rule are distinct-calling 
them "scattered, discrete rules, applicable in differing circumstances"-but nevertheless classifying 
both as "embodi[ments]" of equity). The source of this misunderstanding might be found in Hart and 
Sacks' juxtaposition within a paragraph of references to Reydon' s Case and Blackstone's "fifth rule" 
(that is, fifth sign-"reason and spirit"). See HART, JR. & SACKS, supra note 6, at 1242. 
77. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at 60. Blackstone's illustration for subject matter could also just as 
easily be used for the mischief because the knowledge of the problem precedent is guiding the 
interpreter's choice among the senses that an ambignous term could have. As Blackstone explains: 
Thus, when a law of our Edward III. forbids all ecclesiastical persons to purchase provisions 
at Rome, it might seem to prohibit the buying of grain and other victual; but when we con-
sider that the statute was made to repress the usurpations of the papal see, and that the nomi-
nations to vacant benefices by the pope were called provisions, we shall see that the restraint 
is intended to be laid upon such provisions only. 
Id.; cf BENTHAM, supra note 72, at 117 (criticizing Blackstone's example of "subject-matter" and 
suggesting it is better explained in terms of the mischief to be suppressed). 
78. Id. at 61. For recognition of this overlap, see In re Di Torio, 8 F.2d 279, 279 (N.D. Ill. 1925). In 
the Institutes, Coke glosses a statute's mischief as the "cause of the making of the same." COKE, supra 
note 65, at 682. 
79. As Blackstone puts it: 
An instance of this is given in a case put by Cicero, or whoever was the author of the rhetori-
cal treatise inscribed to Herennius. There was a law, that those who in a storm forsook the 
ship should forfeit all property therein; and the ship and lading should belong entirely to 
those who staid in it. In a dangerous tempest all the mariners forsook the ship, except only 
one sick passenger, who by reason of his disease was unable to get out and escape. By chance 
the ship came safe to port. The sick man kept possession and claimed the benefit of the law. 
Now here all the learned agree, that the sick man is not within the reason of the law; for the 
reason of making it was, to give encouragement to such as should venture their lives to save 
the vessel: but this is a merit, which he could never pretend to, who neither staid in the ship 
upon that account, nor contributed any thing to it's preservation. 
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at 61 (footnote omitted). 
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Another explanation begins with the need for parsimony. Unless the list of 
signs is going to be a vast mishmash, a selection is necessary. That still leaves the 
question of why he included other signs instead of the mischief. 
Here it is helpful to see how the signs fit into Blackstone's larger argument. 
The five signs culminate in "reason and spirit," which Blackstone glosses as "eq-
uity."80 And Blackstone was a famous skeptic of the division between law and 
equity.81 He argues that law and equity are identical in their substance and aims, 
differing only in procedure. 82 To this end, Blackstone tries to show that equity is 
not distinctive because the common law courts themselves engage in equitable 
interpretation. That is what the signs are leading up to-all courts engage in equi-
table interpretation, and therefore it is not distinctive to courts of equity. 
For this argument, for this shift from the final sign category to equity, 
Blackstone needs the final sign to be "reason and spirit," not "mischief." The mis-
chief rule would focus attention backwards on the problem the legislators were 
attempting to solve. When new circumstances emerge, with cases unforeseen by 
the legislator, the mischief rule is not as good of a tool for extending the reach of 
the statute. 83 This statute addressed this mischief; when a new mischief emerges, 
a new statute may be needed. But "reason and spirit" is easier to connect 
with equitable interpretation as presented by Blackstone. It more easily allows 
Blackstone to argue that common law courts engage in equitable interpretation, 
and it more easily produces the danger Blackstone attributes to equitable 
interpretation-that it may "make every judge a legislator, and introduce most in-
finite confusion."84 Blackstone's larger argument is therefore well served by 
omitting the mischief rule in Section 2. 
80. Id. ("From this method of interpreting laws, by the reason of them, arises what we call equity."). 
81. See DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 83 (1989) (describing Blackstone's "guiding argument" as the 
proposition "that no theoretical construction could adequately explain the separation of law and equity 
in English jurisprudence"); Samuel L. Bray, A Parsimonious Equity?: Discussion a/Equity: Conscience 
Goes to Market, 21 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-3, 7 (2020). 
82. See LIEBERMAN, supra note 81, at 84-85; see also John H. Langbein, Introduction to 3 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION OF 1765-
1769, at viii (The Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) (1768) ("[Blackstone] insisted that there were no material 
differences between the substantive law of the courts of law and equity, and he concealed or downplayed 
the facts that made this contention untenable."); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's 
Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 249 (1979) ("[I]t was one of [Blackstone's] central theses that all 
the English courts did the same thing."). Note that there is an important equivocation, for Blackstone is 
using equity and its cognates in two distinct senses. One is Aristotelian, describing equity as the 
exceptional case unforeseen by the legislator-Blackstone cites Grotius, but the view is Aristotle's. The 
other is the more technical sense of equity associated with Chancery. For a discussion of these two 
senses in which Blackstone uses the term, see W. S. Holdsworth, Blackstone's Treatment of Equity, 43 
HARV. L. REv. 1, 3-6 (1929). Rather than seeing this as a confusion, however, we should see the 
conflation of the two senses as critical to Blackstone's critique of equity. 
83. On the mischief and the equity of the statute, see infra note 95. 
84. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at 62. For illustrations of Blackstone's concern about such a state 
of affairs, see generally Emily Kadens, Justice Blackstone's Common Law Orthodoxy, 103 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 1553 (2009). For a contrasting view, arguing for tendencies toward dynamism in Blackstone, 
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The implications of Blackstone's reception of the rule are twofold. First, 
Blackstone helps us see that the mischief overlaps with other interpretive consid-
erations (namely, some of his signs). 85 Second, it is nevertheless true that the mis-
chief is not identical to any of those other interpretive considerations. 
C. HART AND SACKS' TRANSFORMATION 
Hart and Sacks do not ignore the mischief, and in fact, they give it a place of 
central importance. 86 But they also transform it. In The Legal Process, where 
Hart and Sacks describe the technique for inferring purpose, they begin with the 
interpreter's goal of trying "to put itself in imagination in the position of the legis-
lature which enacted the measure," with the assumption that "the legislature was 
made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably."87 
Next: 
The court should then proceed to do, in substance, just what Lord Coke said it 
should do in Heydon' s Case . ... The gist of this approach is to infer purpose 
by comparing the new law with the old. Why would reasonable men, con-
fronted with the law as it was, have enacted this new law to replace it? 
Answering this question, as Lord Coke said, calls for a close look at the "mis-
chief' thought to inhere in the old law and at the "true reason of the remedy" 
provided by the statute for it. 
The most reliable guides to an answer will be found in the instances of unques-
tioned application of the statute. Even in the case of a new statute there almost 
invariably are such instances, in which, because of the perfect fit of words and 
context, the meaning seems unmistakable. 
Once these points of reference are established, they throw a double light. The 
purposes necessarily implied in them illuminate facets of the general purpose. 
At the same time they provide a basis for reasoning by analogy to the disputed 
application in hand.88 
Hart and Sacks proceed to further describe the process of inferring purpose. 
They conclude that if "significant choices" remain, the task "is essentially one of 
creative elaboration of the principles and policies initially formulated in the 
statute."89 This is quite a long way from Reydon' s Case-the imaginative 
reconstruction, the reasonable legislators, the creative elaboration.90 But more 
provided the rituals of law were observed, see Jessie Allen, Blackstone, Expositor and Censor of Law 
Both Made and Found, in BLACKSTONE AND Hrs CRITICS 41 (Anthony Page & Wilfrid Prest eds., 2018). 
85. See infra note 129 and accompanying text. 
86. See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reading Statutes in the Common Law Tradition, 101 VA. L. REv. 
1357, 1370 (2015) (noting that Hart and Sacks' "central example of this technique for inferring purpose 
is ... H eydon' s Case"). 
87. HART,JR. & SACKS, supra note 6, at 1414-15. 
88. Id. at 1415 (alteration in original). 
89. Id. at 1417. 
90. For a more freewheeling adaptation, see Max Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 HARV. L. 
REV. 388, 421-22 (1942) (suggesting thatHeydon' s Case could be "recast to serve a modem need," with 
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important for understanding the reception of Reydon' s Case in Hart and Sacks is 
to see just how preliminary its work is. The mischief is not equated with general 
purpose; rather, the mischief is a basis for inferring purposes, which in turn 
"throw ... light" on the general purpose. 91 
It is understandable that readers of Hart and Sacks would conflate the mischief 
rule and purposivism. If we look at Reydon' s Case through a modern lens, with 
Hart and Sacks' own categories, it is easy to find purpose there. After all, the mis-
chief rule shares several features with purposive interpretation: both are about 
the reasons for laws, both offer an input for decisionmaking that is distinct from 
the words of the statute, and both may be used to put a case inside or outside 
of the bare words. But this conflation is anachronistic, for the reasons discussed 
more thoroughly in Part II. 
Nevertheless, there has been a widespread understanding of Hart and Sacks' 
approach as equivalent to the older common law approach.92 Whether Reydon' s 
Case supports Hart and Sacks is, however, not the point. The point here is simply 
that anachronistic histories have made it harder to think about the mischief rule as 
a distinct concept. 
D. SCALIA'S REJECTION 
The most influential person in the textualist resurgence of the last forty years 
was Justice Scalia, and he had definite views on the mischief rule. He was against 
it. In his late-career collaboration on statutory interpretation with Brian Garner, 
Reading Law, Justice Scalia equates the rule with purposivism.93 Their definition 
of mischief rule points to the definition of purposivism: 
[M]ischief rule: The interpretive doctrine that a statute should be interpreted 
by first identifying the problem (or "mischief') that the statute was designed to 
remedy and then adopting a construction that will suppress the problem and 
advance the remedy. • This is a primarily British name for purposivism. The 
classic and most ancient statement of the rule occurred in Heydon' s Case .... 
The prevailing scholarly view today is that the mischief rule represents "the 
last remnant of the equity of a statute." See PURPOSIVISM.94 
The lexicographic loop is complete, for their definition of purposivism points 
back to the mischief rule: 
the interpreter first asking: "What is the purpose of the statute as a whole? ... Is this statutory purpose 
one that the court feels is good?"). 
91. HART, JR. & SACKS, supra note 6, at 1415. 
92. See supra note 57. 
93. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7. This is not Justice Scalia's best work, but it has rapidly become 
a leading source on statutory interpretation for the Supreme Court. By the end of the October 2019 
Term, it had already been cited in thirty-nine Supreme Court opinions. 
94. Id. at 433-34, 434 n.7 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted) (quoting J.H. BAKER, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 212 (4th ed. 2002)). 
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[P]urposivism: The doctrine that a drafter's "purposes," as perceived by the in-
terpreter, are more important than the words that the drafter has used; specif., 
the idea that a judge-interpreter should seek an answer not in the words of the 
text but in its social, economic, and political objectives. • Broadly speaking, 
purposivism is synonymous with mischief rule. Cf. EQUITY-OF-THE-STATUTE.95 
985 
In other words, Justice Scalia adopted the conventional narrative that draws a 
straight line from Reydon' s Case to Hart and Sacks. And there is little mystery 
about what Justice Scalia would think about the mischief rule, once that equation 
was made. 
Justice Scalia also rejected the mischief rule in his judicial opinions. In Oncale 
v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Jnc.-a Title VII decision that is widely cited in 
the various recent cases about that statute and discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation-he emphasized the disconnect between the text and the evil: 
"[S]tatutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably 
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the 
principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed."96 Although this 
may sound like a truism, it is noteworthy that Oncale cited no authority.97 
In Reading Law, Scalia and Garner give a central place to Oncale in their expo-
sition of something they present as if it were a traditional canon of interpretation, 
namely the "General-Terms Canon[:] General terms are to be given their general 
95. Id. at 438 (emphasis omitted). Scalia and Garner's definition of equity of the statute, in tum, is a 
fine piece of anachronism, reading the long history of statutory interpretation as a continuous battle 
between two sides: 
[E]quity of the statute: The supposed fair application intended for an enactment, as the inter-
preter's paramount concern-allowing departures from the statute's literal words. • This 
statute-specific ally of purposivism arose in the Middle Ages, mostly fell into disuse by the 
Renaissance, was thoroughly rejected for most of the 19th century, and has made spasmodic 
comebacks in American law since then. See PURPOSIVISM. 
Id. at 428 (emphasis omitted). In early modem legal usage, there does not appear to be any distinction 
between the mischief rule, the equity of the statute, and the fiction of legislative intention. There is, 
however, a distinction in St. Germain between the equity of the statute, used to bring in analogous cases; 
and equity in the Aristotelian sense, used to recognize exceptions out of the statute. See DISCOURSE 
UPON THE EXPOSICION & UNDERSTANDING£ OF STATUTES, supra note 59, at 78 & nn.163-64. Later on, a 
partial divergence seems to develop with equity being more easily used of broadening interpretation and 
mischief of narrowing interpretation. See Eskridge, Jr., supra note 8, at 999. Eventually, for an 
interpreter who wants to control a statute by reference to some external principle of political morality, 
equity would become a more congenial concept than mischief. For a conceptual rather than historical 
analysis of the two senses in which "equity of the statute" can be used, see generally James Edelman, 
The Equity of the Statute, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF EQUITY 352 (Dennis 
Klimchuk, Irit Samet & Hemy E. Smith eds., 2020). 
96. 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998); see also Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 215 (2010) ("It is not 
for us to rewrite the statute so that it covers only what we think is necessary to achieve what we think 
Congress really intended."). 
97. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79. There is, however, ample authority for the first part of the statement-that 
is, a statute may go beyond the precipitating evil. E.g., S. Beach Marina, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 724 P.2d 
788, 792 (Or. 1986); see also Jerome Park Co. v. Bd. of Police, 11 Abb. N. Cas. 342, 347 (Ct. Com. PL 
N.Y.C. & Cty. 1882) (recognizing that broad statutory langnage can apply to later emerging evils). 
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meaning."98 Such terms, they say, "are not to be arbitrarily limited."99 They 
acknowledge the objection that "those who adopted [a] provision had in mind a 
particular narrow objective," but quote Oncale and consider its statement about 
statutes going beyond the principal evil to be a "conclusive response to this 
argument." 100 
It is not, however, a conclusive response. Indeed, there are at least three ways 
to understand the observation that a statutory prohibition may go beyond ( or for 
that matter stop short of) the principal evil. First, it could be a recognition that the 
mischief rule is not the only consideration, and that other interpretive considera-
tions might counsel choosing a different scope that is not tied to the mischief. 101 
In United States v. Wiltberger, for example, Chief Justice Marshall declined to 
read a statute as expansively as its mischief, not because the mischief was irrele-
vant, but because it was a penal statute and its structure supported a narrower 
reading. 102 Second, it could be an expression of the oft-stated idea that the mis-
chief rule only comes into play for an ambiguous statute. 103 Third, it could be, as 
Justice Scalia takes it, a reason to entirely ignore the mischief. 
Of these three ways of understanding the point, the first is compatible with the 
mischief rule as presented in this Article-the mischief is part of the context that 
an interpreter can use both to determine that the text is ambiguous and to resolve 
the ambiguity. 104 The second understanding is compatible with a narrower view 
of the mischief rule----one in which it may be used only if the interpreter has al-
ready found the text ambiguous. The third understanding, chosen by Justice 
Scalia, is not compatible with the mischief rule. But there is nothing obvious 
98. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7, at 101, 104 (emphasis omitted). On general terms, see infra 
note 249. 
99. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7, at 101. 
100. Id. at 103--04, 104 n.7. 
101. For example, the interpreter might simply think the best interpretation of the statutory provision 
is broader than the mischief. See, e.g., Brewer's Lessee v. Blougher, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 178, 198-99 
(1840). 
102. See 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 105 (1820); see also United States v. Sheldon, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 119, 
121-22 (1817) ("It may be admitted, that the mischief is the same, whether the enemy be supplied with 
provisions in the one way or the other; but this affords no good reason for construing a penal law by equity, 
so as to extend it to cases not within the correct and ordinary meaning of the expressions of the law, 
particularly when it is confirmed by the interpretation which the legislature has given to the same 
expressions in the same law."). For Chief Justice Marshall's consideration of the mischief in other cases, 
see, for example, Brown v. State of Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 440 (1827) (considering the 
mischief in constitutional interpretation) and United States v. Daniel, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 542, 547-48 
(1821) ( considering the mischief in statutory interpretation). On penal statutes and the mischief rule, 
compare Daggett v. State, 4 Conn. 60, 63-64 (Conn. 1821) (rejecting use of mischief to support a broader 
reading of a penal statute), and Glanville Williams, Statute Interpretation, Prostitution and the Rule of 
Law, in CRIME, PROOF AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF SIR RUPERT CROSS 71 (1981) (criticizing 
the use of the mischief rule to expand criminal statutes), with United States v. Holte, 236 U.S. 140, 144 
(1915) (favoring a broader interpretation that aligned with the mischief, even in a penal statute), and Ash 
Sheep Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1920) (same). 
103. For critique, see supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text, and infra notes 130-34 and 
accompanying text. 
104. See infra notes 130--34 and accompanying text. 
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about the third option, and he gives no argument to justify it. At any rate, the bot-
tom line is that Justice Scalia appears to leave no room for the mischief rule in the 
interpretation of statutes. For him, at least sometimes, 105 consideration of the mis-
chief is nothing more than "result-driven antitextualism. "106 
What explains Justice Scalia's hostility to the mischief rule, and his resistance 
to allowing the mischief to be part of the statutory context? At least four explana-
tions are possible. 
First, Justice Scalia was trained in a world where Hart and Sacks dominated statu-
tory interpretation, and perhaps he accepted their framing of their position as his foil. 
Second, in deciding to exclude the mischief from the relevant context, Justice 
Scalia might have been working not so much from context to sources as from 
sources to context. In other words, perhaps he thought (not without reason) that 
one place to find the mischief would be legislative history. Absolutely committed 
to the rejection of legislative history, he could not ask a question to which legisla-
tive history might provide the answer. 107 
Third, Justice Scalia's preference for rules over standards is well-known. 108 
When declining to read a statute in light of the mischief, he sometimes argued 
that the resulting scope for the statute would be indeterminate and unpredict-
able.109 His critique partly misses the mark: an interpretation of the text in light of 
the mischief will often be more predictable to the reasonable observer than the 
bare text read for all it is worth (for example, Yates, Bond, Gonzales v. 
Oregon). 110 But he is right that a text read in light of the mischief will tend to 
105. For Justice Scalia's consideration of the mischief under the rubric of "historical context," see, 
for example, Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 268-70 (2003) (noting that "[w]hen Congress adopted [the 
relevant statutory provision] in 1967, the immediate issue was precisely the involvement of the courts in 
fashioning electoral plans," and thus concluding that"[ w]ith all this threat of judicially imposed at-large 
elections, and (as far as we are aware) no threat of a legislatively imposed change to at-large elections, it 
is most unlikely that [the statutory provision] was directed solely at legislative reapportionment"), and 
Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 781-82, 781 n.10 (2000) ("As the 
historical context makes clear, and as we have often observed, the FCA was enacted in 1863 with the 
principal goal of 'stopping the massive frauds perpetrated by large [private] contractors during the Civil 
War."' (quoting United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303,309 (1976))). 
106. Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 868 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. at 873 
(rejecting the majority's use of "the 'concerns' driving the Convention-' acts of war, assassination, and 
terrorism' -as guideposts of statutory meaning"). 
107. On the mischief rule and legislative history, see infra notes 153-59 and accompanying text. 
108. See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 1175 
(1989). 
109. See, e.g., Bond, 572 U.S. at 872-73 (Scalia, J., concurring); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 
287-98 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
110. The point is linguistic, not legal. Consider an example drawn from Timothy Endicott's 
discussion of pragmatic vagueness: to whom does the expression "violinist" apply? TIMOTHY A. 0. 
ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 51 (2000). If we applied it to everyone who had ever held a violin and 
drawn a bow across a string, there would be more determinacy but less predictability; but if we applied it 
"only to people who are reasonably skilful or at least persistent," id., the scope of the term would be less 
determinate yet closer to what the reader will usually expect. By contrast, Justice Scalia yoked rules and 
predictability. See Scalia, supra note 108, at 1179. 
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have a fuzzier boundary. 111 
Finally, there are tensions and inconsistencies in Justice Scalia's interpre-
tive jurisprudence. Sometimes he is resolutely and purely textualist, 112 and at 
other times he strikes a decidedly traditional pose, allowing practices and 
conventions at the time of enactment to work as a safe harbor. 113 This varia-
tion cannot be explained in terms of statutory provisions versus constitutional 
provisions. 114 
By and large, textualists seem to have accepted Justice Scalia's rejection of the 
mischief rule. The rule does not appear in the decisions of Judge Easterbrook. 115 
Admittedly, it has been suggested by John Manning that the mischief could be 
part of the context for a legal enactment, 116 but he has not developed the point, 117 
111. Examples include Bond, see supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text; Nashville & K. R. Co. v. 
Davis, 78 S.W. 1050 (Tenn. 1902), see supra text accompanying note l; and the hypothetical statute 
requiring the leashing of dogs in a park, see infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text. When choosing 
a narrower construction because of the mischief, some courts have noted that the resulting scope is 
somewhat indeterminate. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 25 S.C.L. (Chev.) 157, 160 (Ct. App. 1840) ("We will 
leave the cases to be adjudged as they arise."). Note that even though the mischief rule will tend to 
increase this at-the-line indeterminacy, that does not mean that it systematically increases judicial 
discretion. But see Tara Leigh Grove, Commentary, Which Textualism?, 134 HARV. L. REv. 265, 295-
96 (2020). To the contrary, this Article argues that relying on context (including the mischief) can allow 
judges to temper their creativity and lessen legislative surprise at their interpretations. Nor should these 
effects be surprising because there is reason to doubt that increasing interpretive sources increases 
judicial discretion. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 
WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 373 (1994) (noting that a textualist court has "fewer tools at its disposal to 
particularize the meaning of the text," and, "like the painter working with a small pallet," the court 
"necessarily has to become more imaginative in resolving questions of statutory interpretation"). See 
generally Adam M. Samaha, Looking Over a Crowd-Do More Interpretive Sources Mean More 
Discretion?, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554 (2017) (answering the titular question in the negative). 
112. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78-82 (1998). 
113. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568-70 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
114. The leading example that Scalia and Gamer give for their general-terms canon is the Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1872). SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7, at 101-03. The tension 
between Justice Scalia' s purer textualism and his traditionalism is not recognized in Reading Law; there 
are no citations to United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 568-70 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Cf Michael W. 
McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1127, 1137 n.45 (1998) 
(noting inconsistency in Justice Scalia's interpretive approach); infra note 249 and accompanying text 
(same). 
115. Judge Easterbrook rejects the mischief rule and has apparently never used it in a judicial 
opinion. Although he has said that when we interpret words, one aspect of context is "the problems 
the authors were addressing," Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory 
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 61, 61 (1994), this passage comes in a broader description 
of interpretation, which he then retreats from for purposes of legal interpretation, id. at 64. For another 
line of thought in Judge Easterbrook' s work that is more consistent with the mischief rule, see infra 
note 244. 
116. See Manning, supra note 40, at 84-85 ("Because speakers use language purposively, textualists 
recognize that the relevant context for a statutory text includes the mischiefs the authors were 
addressing."). 
117. E.g., John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2387, 2456-76 (2003) 
( considering alternatives to the absurdity doctrine but not discussing the mischief). 
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and he has sometimes associated the mischief rule with purposivism. 118 In 
Bostock v. Clayton County, all of the opinions-which were written by Justices 
Gorsuch, Alito, and Kavanaugh-present themselves as textualist and cite with 
apparent approval Justice Scalia's dicta in Oncale about the "principal evil"; 119 
none clearly relies on the mischief. 12° For textualists, then, the dominant positions 
on the mischief rule seem to be rejection and silence. 121 
One consequence may be that textualists have tended to stress American 
exceptionalism (especially with respect to the separation of powers) as a way to 
distance American legal interpretation from what they perceive, because of the 
mischief rule, to be the more purposivist tradition of the common law. But this 
idea-that textualists, reacting to and being shaped by Hart and Sacks, have mis-
understood how common law courts interpreted statutes and have emphasized 
constitutional structure in part to separate federal courts from the common law 
tradition-deserves more consideration than it can receive in this Article. 
*** 
The conventional narrative is that Reydon' s Case established a purposive 
approach to statutory interpretation, specifically in the form of the mischief rule, 
and that this approach was carried forward by Blackstone in the eighteenth cen-
tury and by Hart and Sacks in the twentieth. Despite the inaccuracies of this nar-
rative, it has a strong hold. Courts and scholars slide between mischief and 
purpose, sometimes using them interchangeably. 122 
118. See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REv. 419, 424-25 (2005) 
[hereinafter Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent] ("[Textualists] subscribe to the general principle 
that texts should be taken at face value-with no implied extensions of specific texts or exceptions to 
general ones--even if the legislation will then have an awkward relationship to the apparent background 
intention or purpose that produced it."); Manning, supra note 40, at 93 (placing "public knowledge of the 
mischief the lawmakers sought to address" within the policy context that is emphasized by purposivists); 
John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. 
REv. 2003, 2055 (2005) (referring to "[l]ooking at the precise mischiefs that underlay the document's 
adoption" as "a classic move of purposivism"). 
119. See 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1749, 1751-52 (2020); id. at 1773-74 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 1834 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). For three views of how textualist the opinions are, see Mitchell N. Berman 
& Guha Krishnamurthi, Bostock Was Bogus: Textualism, Pluralism, and Title VII (Feb. 9, 2021) 
(unpublished manuscript) (available at https://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3777519 
[https://perma.cc/5P5D-JCAX]); Grove, supra note 111; and Re, supra note 15. 
120. The dissenting opinions did refer in passing to the mischief or problem to which the statute was 
directed. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1774 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 1835 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) 
(faulting the majority for ignoring "the social realities that distinguish between the kinds of biases that 
the statute sought to exclude from the workplace from those it did not" (quoting Zarda v. Altitude 
Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 162 (2d Cir. 2018) (Lynch, J., dissenting), aff d, Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1731)). 
But neither relied on the mischief as Judge Lynch did in his dissent inZarda. See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 143 
(Lynch, J., dissenting). 
121. Cf Koppelman, supra note 14, at 21 (calling the mischief rule a "subtractive move[]" that "is 
probably barred by the new textualism"); id. at 25 ("The new textualism's rejection of the mischief rule 
is one of its deepest weaknesses."). 
122. E.g., Sales, supra note 57, at 56 (noting that courts read a statute's language "in the light of the 
scheme of the Act as a whole and its overall purpose (sometimes called the mischief rule)"). 
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Yet there is daylight between these concepts, if we know to look for it. In a 
recent article, Abbe Gluck and Judge Richard Posner reported the results of a sur-
vey of forty-two federal judges. 123 They found overwhelming support for consid-
ering purpose, or, as a subheading in their article puts it: "Almost All Judges 
Invoked Purpose."124 But it is fascinating to find that this is the authors' gloss, not 
the statements of the judges themselves. As Gluck and Posner report: "Only four 
of the forty-two judges we spoke with did not mention purpose as an appropriate 
tool of statutory interpretation. The judges we spoke with interpreted the search 
for purpose in terms of 'the mischief' or 'the problem that gave rise to the statute 
in the first place. "'125 Why were the judges interviewed by Gluck and Posner 
more comfortable speaking in the language of mischief, than in the language of 
purpose? What exactly is the mischief? 
II. FINDING THE MISCHIEF 
The word mischief was defined essentially the same way in Black's Law 
Dictionary for a century: "In legislative parlance, the word is sometimes used to 
signify the evil or danger which a statute is intended to cure or avoid."126 A simi-
lar legal definition is offered in the Oxford English Dictionary: "[A] disability or 
wrong which a person suffers, esp. one which it is the object of a statute to 
remove or for which equity affords a remedy." 127 The "mischief rule" is the 
instruction to courts to consider the mischief, as well as the way in which the stat-
ute is a remedy for the mischief. 128 As straightforward as this may seem, two pre-
liminary qualifications need to be noted before the analysis in this Part proceeds. 
First, the description of the mischief rule in this Part is more analytically crisp than 
the historical materials would support. Mischief, purpose, intention, equity, etc.-this 
cluster of terms related to statutory interpretation has been used with remarkable vari-
ety in the common law systems over the last five centuries: sometimes broadly and 
sometimes narrowly, overlappingly and then in contradistinction, to express one ideol-
ogy or to reject another, with concerns about Stuart monarchs uppermost or concerns 
about the discretion of federal judges, as conventional terms that bear no special 
weight and as terms used with idiosyncratic force. 129 Thus there is no one historical 
123. Gluck & Posner, supra note 71. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. (footnote omitted). 
126. Mischief, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). This was the definition from the first 
edition (1891) through the sixth edition (1990). In subsequent editions the definition has grown bloated 
and imprecise, and the eleventh edition (2019) introduces the erroneous equation of the mischief rule 
with purposivism. See Mischief Rule, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (stating that it "is a 
primarily British name for purposivism"). 
127. Mischief, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2002). 
128. See supra Section I.A (discussing Reydon' s Case). 
129. See, e.g., 6 BAKER, OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 59, at 76-81 
(discussing equity, mischief, and intent in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries); JOHN BELL & 
GEORGE ENGLE, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 19 (2d ed. 1987) (describing "the purposive approach [as] 
more limited than one which tries to 'suppress the mischief"'); DOE, supra note 59, at 173-74 (finding 
differences in how the common law and chancery of the fifteenth century approached "inconvenience" 
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concept of the mischief. If a historical definition were attempted, it would have to be a 
genealogy of these interconnected and impacting ideas, but that is not attempted here. 
Instead, the focus is on a discernible and demarcated concept of the mischief that is 
one of the things that travels under that name. 
Second, the mischief is not here defined by recourse to the older texts on statutory 
interpretation. Some of them classify the mischief rule as an interpretive consideration 
that may resolve the meaning of an ambiguous statute, but that may not be used to 
identify an ambiguity.130 Yet there are conflicting authorities on this point, 131 and there 
is reason for doubt: context is not a device for resolving ambiguity that comes into 
play only after the reading of the text. And the mischief is part of a legal enactment's 
context.132 This view of the mischief as part of the interpretive process prior to the re-
solution of ambiguity accords with the function of other kinds of legal context, such as 
background principles of law.133 It also fits the intuitions of Justice Thomas, Justice 
Ginsburg, and Judge Lynch in CSX, Yates, and Zarda respectively, as well as the ma-
jority of the Court in Bond: the mischief was logically anterior to the text, something 
the interpreter knew while reading the text itself.134 
What follows, then, is an analytical description of the mischief rule, one that is 
in contact with how the mischief rule has functioned in the past but is especially 
and "mischief'); J. G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 319-21 (Chicago, 
Callaghan & Co. 1891) (referring to intention, general purpose, subject matter, context, and mischief); 
Blatt, supra note 76, at 821 (showing fluctuations in terms for statutory interpretation); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 
321, 332 (1990) (distinguishing intentionalism from purposivism, but equating the latter with "a flexible 
'mischief' approach"); cf DISCOURSE UPON THE EXPOSICION & UNDERSTANDING£ OF STATUTES, supra 
note 59 (analyzing how the development of statutory interpretation between the Year Books and 
Blackstone was tied to changing conceptions of the statute and oflegislative authority). 
130. See, e.g., SUTHERLAND, supra note 129, at 320 ("When the words are not explicit[,] the intention 
is to be collected from the context[,] from the occasion and necessity of the law[,] from the mischief felt, 
and [the objects and] the remedy in view; and the intention is to be taken or presumed[,] according to 
what is consonant [to] reason and good discretion." (quoting 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON 
AMERICAN LAW *462 (Charles M. Barnes ed., 13th ed. 1884))). The more general proposition was that 
"if the statute is plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction or interpretation." THEODORE 
SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF 
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 231 (New York, John S. Voorhies 1857). 
131. E.g., United States v. Lewis, 192 F. 633, 639 (E.D. Mo. 1911) (considering the mischief even 
though "the language of that act is clear and free from ambiguity"); RUPERT CROSS, PRECEDENT IN 
ENGLISH LA w 185 (1961) (noting "conflicting schools of thought" on whether the mischief rule applies 
only "to cases of ambiguity"). Some statutes codifying the mischief rule direct that it should be used in 
all cases of statutory interpretation, and others direct that it should be used when there is ambiguity. See 
supra note 68. For an analysis of lexical ordering in statutory interpretation, see generally Samalra, 
supra note 45. 
132. For discussion, see supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text. 
133. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Revisited, 112 HARV. L. 
REV. 1913, 1913-14 (1999). 
134. See infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text; see also Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 
U.S. 637, 642, 649 (2013) (describing the abuses that "prompted" Congress to enact the Indian Child 
Welfare Act and concluding that the Court's interpretation of the act "comports with the statutory text 
[ which] demonstrat[ es] ... the primary mischief the ICW A was designed to counteract"). Ryan Doerfler 
has criticized "double count[ing]" the same interpretive consideration when (a) deciding whether a text 
is ambiguous and (b) resolving the ambiguity. Doerfler, supra note 47, at 535-36. I consider the line 
between ambiguity-construction and ambiguity-resolution to be more fluid. 
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attendant to how it could function in the present. The mischief is analyzed as a 
problem antecedent to the law in Section II.A, the sources for identifying it are dis-
cussed in Section 11.B, and mischief and purpose are distinguished in Section 11.C. 
A. THE MISCHIEF AS A PROBLEM ANTECEDENT TO THE LAW 
The "evil" or "mischief' is logically prior to the enactment of a statute. It is 
also typical for the mischief to be temporally prior to the statute, but that is not 
strictly required. That is, the mischief could be anticipated but entirely future: a 
statute might be passed in the spring to remedy a mischief that will not occur until 
the following winter, for example. 
Identifying the mischief "necessarily involve[s] placing the statute in a histori-
cal context."135 The mischief is sometimes described as (a) the problem that pre-
ceded the legislative act and to which the act was directed, or (b) the deficient 
state of the law prior to the legislative act. One might say that the problem was 
the law itself. Or one might say the law's failure to remedy the problem was the 
real problem. Accordingly, some statements of the mischief rule emphasize the 
social and some the legal. 136 
These two concepts blend together, and both are critical to understanding the 
mischief. Although the problem that preceded the act is central-as the spur to 
the act-if it is a past event, then it cannot strictly speaking be remedied by the 
new law. The past cannot be undone. Thus, the mischief has a compound signifi-
cance: it is the social problem, and it is also the inadequacy in the law that 
allowed or allows that problem. 
This compound significance is unsurprising, given that the evil or mischief is a 
technical legal concept. Although the intuition that context and setting matter is 
pervasive in the interpretation of texts, the legal formulation cannot be applied 
willy-nilly to interpretation more generally. There is no mischief rule for poems. 
But legislatures exist to change the law to improve the social condition; problems 
out there in the world, so to speak, are the legislature's concern. 
The mischief is external to the legislators. The mischief is not so much in the 
mind of the legislator as in the sight of the legislator. 137 As the U.S. Supreme 
Court said in Smith v. Townsend, in words it considered equivalent to the mischief 
rule as stated in Reydon' s Case, "courts, in construing a statute, may with propri-
ety recur to the history of the times when it was passed"; 138 and when "endeavor-
ing to ascertain what the congress of 1862 intended, we must, as far as possible, 
135. 6 BAKER, OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 59. 
136. E.g., WILLIAM TWINING & DAVID MIERS, How TO Do THINGS WITH RULES: A PRIMER OF 
INTERPRETATION 153 n.67 (4th ed. 1999) ("Reydon' s Case can be interpreted as taking mischiefs of the 
law, rather than social problems, as the starting point."). It is especially apt to think of the evil as a legal 
deficiency when the legislative action is the repeal of a statute or the reversal of a judicial decision. 
137. See, e.g., Ezekiel v. Dixon, 3 Ga. 146, 158 (1847) (referring, in an opinion that extols the virtues 
of plain text, to "the mischief which the Assembly had in its eye at the time"). 
138. Smith v. Townsend, 148 U.S. 490,494 (1893) (quoting United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 91 
U.S. 72, 79 (1875)). The quotation continues: "and this is frequently necessary, in order to ascertain the 
reason as well as the meaning of particular provisions in it." Id. 
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place ourselves in the light that congress enjoyed, [and] look at things as they 
appeared to it."139 Or as the Court said in one of the less controversial parts of one 
of its more controversial statutory interpretation decisions, "another guide to the 
meaning of a statute is found in the evil which it is designed to remedy; and for 
this the court properly looks at contemporaneous events, the situation as it 
existed, and as it was pressed upon the attention of the legislative body. "140 
It would be incorrect to see the mischief, this antecedent negative state of 
affairs, as something entirely objective. Anita Krishnakumar captures this fluidity 
by applying two different adjectives to the mischief: it is, at one and the same 
time, the "background mischief' 141 and the "motivating mischief."142 In other 
words, the mischief is perspectival: one person could see the mischief one way, 
and another could see it differently. The bill under consideration might reflect an 
incompletely theorized agreement about the mischief. Nevertheless, what is being 
sought is exterior to the legislator. As Peter Strauss has said, "This inquiry, prop-
erly regarded, is prelegal-an inquiry into the conditions generating legislative 
action, not the meaning of the action itself. "143 That is relevant for the question of 
sources. 
139. Id. at 495 (quoting Platt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 99 U.S. 48, 64 (1878)). The quotation 
continues: "and discover its purpose from the language used in connection with the attending 
circumstances." Id.; see also Kelly v. Dewey, 149 A. 840, 842-43 (Conn. 1930) (considering "the 
circumstances and conditions known to the Legislature at the time of [the statute's] enactment," 
including the existing law, the known evil, and the official recommendation that "[t]he Legislature ... 
had before it"); LaRue, supra note 57, at 753 (describing the technique in Reydon' s Case in terms of 
"two things: (1) the judge reads the statute in the context of pre-existing law, but (2) the judge examines 
that pre-existing law from the point of view of the legislator and not from his own point of view"). 
140. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 463 (1892). Nevertheless, in Holy Trinity 
Church, because of the clarity of the language, the best account of the legislative decision would have 
been that the statute simply went beyond the mischief. On the Court's invocation of the evil being less 
remarkable than its use oflegislative history, see Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of 
Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1833, 1843 (1998). 
As Vermeule puts it: 
The Court also argued that the statute should be limited to the scope of the evil that the stat-
ute was designed to remedy, as evidenced by "contemporaneous events." It was "common 
knowledge" that the act's "motive" was to prevent an influx of "cheap, unskilled labor" in 
the form of "an ignorant and servile class of foreigu laborers." 
So far the Court's methods were familiar, whatever the merit of its conclusions. The 
Court's next source for determining congressional intent, however, was internal legislative 
history, and the opinion gave no explanation for that break from traditional doctrine. 
Id. (footnote omitted). On post-Holy Trinity Church developments that made use of legislative history 
routine, see generally Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative 
State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890-1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266 (2013). 
141. Krishnakumar, supra note 12, at 1278 n.9, 1339, 1347. 
142. Id. at 1319; see also id. at 1281, 1331 ("the mischief that motivated"). 
143. Strauss, supra note 9, at 258. Strauss helpfully distinguishes a statute's "political history" from 
its "legislative history," id. at 243 & n.3, though he fails to press the distinction home, see id. at 257 
(insisting on finding the mischief in "[h]earings, debates, and reports"). 
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B. SOURCES FOR IDENTIFYING THE MISCHIEF 
The mischief may be common knowledge, but as time passes a court may be 
more likely to discern the mischief through documentary evidence. As discussed 
here, that evidence might come from the statute itself, contemporaneous events, 
popular debate, and government reports; for some interpreters it might also come 
from legislative history. 
At first, what the court relies on may simply be "general public knowledge of 
what was considered to be the mischief that needed remedying."144 In other 
words, judicial notice. 145 
When those contemporaneous events are not in the memory of the interpreter, 
however, or as they begin to fade from that memory or become a subject of dis-
pute, they will need to be established in other ways. One of those ways is by ex-
amination of the statute itself, especially if there are enacted findings. 146 Note that 
there is some authority that the mischief can be gleaned only from the statute 
itself. 147 But such a limitation would not accord with the Court's recent cases 
144. HART, JR. & SACKS, supra note 6, at 1415; see also Duparquet Huot & Moneuse Co. v. Evans, 
297 U.S. 216, 218 (1936) (Cardozo, J.) ("The evils and embarrassments that brought § 77B into 
existence are matters of common knowledge."); United States v. Black, 24 F. Cas. 1156, 1158 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1875) (No. 14,602) ("We must therefore endeavor to ascertain what the mischief intended to be 
remedied was. The framer of the act has not enabled us to determine this by any recital in the section 
itself, and we are therefore left to infer in from our knowledge of the state of the law at the time, and of 
the practical grievances generally complained of." (quoting Lyde v. Barnard (1836) 150 Eng. Rep. 363, 
368; 1 M. & W. 101, 114 (Exch. of Pleas))); Edwards v. Barksdale, 11 S.C. Eq. (2 Hill Eq.) 416, 418 
(App. Eq. 1836) ("We know what the canons of the common law were, in relation to descents; and we 
perfectly well know the evil which was intended to be remedied."). 
145. See, e.g., Smith v. Townsend, 148 U.S. 490,495 (1893). 
146. E.g., Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 649 (2013) ("The statutory text expressly 
highlights the primary problem that the statute was intended to solve."); Bulala v. Boyd, 389 S.E.2d 670, 
675 (Va. 1990) (stating "the problem described in the preamble," which is the mischief, though also 
using the words mischief and purpose interchangeably); see Jarrod Shobe, Enacted Legislative Findings 
and Purposes, 86 U. Cm. L. REV. 669, 680 (2019) ("[F]indings often recite facts that Congress found as 
part of developing the legislation, which are generally an explanation of the 'mischief' that prompted the 
statute."); see also BENTHAM, supra note 72, at 141-43 (using the mischief identified in a preamble to 
interpret a statutory reference to "sheep, or other Cattle"); DISCOURSE UPON THE EXPOSICION & 
UNDERSTANDING£ OF STATUTES, supra note 59, at 114 n.28 (citing early modem usage of preambles to 
ascertain the mischief-in Francis Bacon's words, "the preamble sets up the mark, and the body of the 
law levels at it"); FRANKFURTER, supra note 42, at 24 (giving an example from the reign of Edward VI); 
1 REPORTS FROM THE LOST NOTEBOOKS OF SIR JAMES DYER, supra note 62, at Ix ("Dyer taught that 
preambles were 'a key to open the minds of the makers of the act, and the mischiefs which they intended 
to remedy."' (quoting Stowell v. Lord Zouche (1565), Plowd. 353v at fo. 369r)). An example of a court 
determining the subject of a statute from other words in the statute is Morris v. United States, 168 F. 682, 
684-85 (8th Cir. 1909) (reading "every person" as referring only to oleomargarine manufacturers and 
dealers, "in harmony with the subject of legislation"). 
147. E.g., SEDGWICK, supra note 130, at 240-43; cf SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7, at 33 (arguing 
that "the purpose of the text ... is a vital part of its context," but that it should "be gathered only from 
the text itself''). But see Brewer's Lessee v. Blougher, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 178, 198 (1840) ("It is 
undoubtedly the duty of the Court to ascertain the meaning of the legislature, from the words used in the 
statute, and the subject matter to which it relates." (emphasis added)); Black, 24 F. Cas. at 1158 (citing 
Lyde, 150 Eng. Rep. at 368, 1 M. & W. at 114); W. Ivor Jennings, Courts and Administrative Law-The 
Experience of English Housing Legislation, 49 HARV. L. REv. 426,453 (1936) ("To study the evils that 
social legislation is intended to remedy it is necessary to look outside the statutes."). 
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using the mischief, such as Bond (referring to a painting by John Singer 
Sargent),148 and Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl (quoting a judicial gloss on the 
"rising concern" behind the statute ). 149 Nor would the limitation be a sensible 
one-what is putatively gleaned from the statute itself will depend in part on the 
judge's knowledge of the world. 150 
Another means of establishing the mischief is sources that show the popular 
debate preceding the enactment, including secondary sources that summarize that 
debate. 151 
Yet another means through which the mischief has been identified is the find-
ings of committee reports or government commissions. When English courts 
applied the "Hansard rule," refusing to consider Parliamentary debates, they 
nevertheless considered the findings in government reports that led to legislative 
action, using these reports to determine the mischief. 152 
Another possible source is legislative history more broadly conceived. 153 The 
statements of individual legislators and of committees may summarize, reflect, or 
interact with the debate preceding the legislative action. 154 (Of course, all of the 
148. Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 847 (2014). 
149. 570 U.S. at 642. 
150. See Koppelman, supra note 14, at 21 & n.108 (critiquing Scalia and Garner for abandoning their 
precept that the purpose or mischief can only be found in the words of the statute when they add 
"sizable" to the "colloquial meaning" of vehicle in "[n]o vehicles in the park"); see also William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 560---62 (2013) 
(reviewing SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 7). Indeed, in the sixteenth century, William Fleetwood 
criticized mistakes about the mischief that would occur when an interpreter tried to read it off the statute. 
See BAKER, REINVENTION OF MAGNA CARTA, supra note 59, at 222-23. 
151. E.g., Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455,463 (1946) (citing, among other things, Hugh A. 
Fisher & Matthew F. McGuire, Kidnapping and the So-Called Lindbergh Law, 12 N.Y.U. L.Q. REv. 
646, 653 (1935)); Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 137-42 (2d Cir. 2018) (Lynch, J., 
dissenting) (citing secondary sources that summarize the popular debate preceding enactment of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964), aff d, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020); Calm v. Berryman, 
408 P.3d 1012, 1015 (N.M. 2017) (citing previous cases describing the problem addressed by the 
legislature, including a case relying on Ruth L. Kovnat, Medical Malpractice Legislation in New 
Mexico, 7 N.M. L. REV. 5, 7 (1977)). Also useful may be summaries of the legal developments that 
preceded and generated the statute. See Lofton v. State, 416 So. 2d 522, 523 & n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1982) (citing Lawrence W. Smith, Fla. Stat.§ 806.01: Florida Arson Law-The Evolution of the 1979 
Amendments, 8 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 81 (1980)). 
152. See William S. Jordan, III, Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation: The Relevance of 
English Practice, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 13-17 (1994). On the English tradition regarding statutory 
interpretation, see generally Magyar, supra note 18. 
153. See, e.g., Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. at 649; Chatwin, 326 U.S. at 462---63; State v. Campbell, 
429 A.2d 960,962 (Conn. 1980); Gletzer v. Harris, 909 N.E.2d 1224, 1228 (N.Y. 2009). 
154. E.g., Elliot Coal Mining Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 17 F.3d 616,631 (3d 
Cir. 1994); see also Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625 (1935) ("While the general 
rule precludes the use of these debates to explain the meaning of the words of the statute, they may be 
considered as reflecting light upon its general purposes and the evils which it sought to remedy."); 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON How TO READ STATUTES AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 5 (2016) ("[I]f the relevant congressional committee reports described the Lafayette Park 
statute as responsive to a series of accidents in which bicyclists and skateboarders had run into children 
and knocked over elderly visitors, the rule of law is not well-served by an abstract textualist approach 
that reads bicycles and skateboards out of the statute."); Mamring, supra note 10, at 733 ("Just as a book 
996 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JouRNAL [Vol. 109:967 
familiar disagreements about legislative history reappear, including the constitu-
tional and prudential arguments.) 
The inquiry into the mischief should not, however, be conflated with the use of 
legislative history. 155 Max Radin said, "The 'legislative history' of a statute is 
taken to mean the successive forms in which the statute is found from the first 
draft presented until its final passage."156 He continued that it "is different obvi-
ously from the history of the agitation which resulted in the fact that such a statute 
was proposed at all. It is this latter history which is contained in the famous four 
considerations established by the barons of the exchequer in Heydon's Case and 
popularized by Blackstone."157 
A court's use of both common knowledge and additional sources is illustrated 
by Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan. 158 Justice Field, while riding circuit, had to consider a 
San Francisco ordinance that was on its face race-neutral but was widely recog-
nized as intended to force Chinese men to pay a large fine rather than submit to 
having their "queues" cut. Justice Field said: 
The ordinance was intended only for the Chinese in San Francisco. This was 
avowed by the supervisors on its passage, and was so understood by every one. 
The ordinance is known in the community as the "Queue Ordinance" .... The 
statements of supervisors in debate on the passage of the ordinance cannot, it 
is true, be resorted to for the purpose of explaining the meaning of the terms 
used; but they can be resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining the general 
object of the legislation proposed, and the mischiefs sought to be remedied. 
Besides, we cannot shut our eyes to matters of public notoriety and general 
cognizance. 159 
With any of these sources, what is sought can be considered a kind of equaliza-
tion. For a new statute, the mischief is more likely to be well-known to all. It is 
fresh in the interpreter's mind as context for the statute regardless of whether she 
wants to think of the mischief as a distinct category. What the mischief rule does, 
therefore, is twofold. For a new statute, the rule encourages the interpreter to 
bring this idea to the surface and to be open about this category, permitting con-
testation about what the mischief was. For an old or unfamiliar statute, the mis-
chief rule allows the interpreter to try to consciously put herself in the position 
she would be in if the statute were new. 
or newspaper or law review article may reveal the reasons for passing legislation, so too might the 
legislative history, which is itself produced by well-informed observers on the scene."). 
155. Cf State v. Victor 0., 128 A.3d 940,949 (Conn. 2016) ("Although our research has not revealed 
any legislative history explaining the rationale for these amendments, it is well established that, '[i]n 
determining the true meaning of a statute when there is genuine uncertainty as to how it should apply, 
identifying the problem in society to which the legislature addressed itself by examining the legislative 
history of the statute under litigation is helpful."' ( quoting Campbell, 429 A.2d at 962)). 
156. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 873 n.21 (1930). 
157. Id. (citation omitted); see also Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 144-45 (2d Cir. 
2018) (Lynch, J., dissenting), aff d, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). 
158. 12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6,546). 
159. Id. at 255. 
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C. DISTINGUISHING MISCHIEF AND PURPOSE 
One way to conceptualize the distinction between the mischief and legislative 
purpose, already implicit in the previous discussion, is that the mischief will tend 
to be a negative state of affairs antecedent to the law, whereas the purpose is 
more likely to be an affirmative principle or aim going forward. Indeed, this is 
one reason that not every statute has a mischief. A statute might be enacted for 
the creation of some new good, rather than for the resolution of an existing prob-
lem.160 And within a statute, the provision in question might interact with some 
other provision of the statute, rather than responding to a discernible mischief in 
the world. Even so, as intuitive as the distinction just drawn is, it cannot bear the 
full definitional weight, because negative and positive can be a matter of 
characterization. 
Consider, therefore, distinguishing mischief and purpose in terms of a theory 
of action. 161 As suggested in the Introduction, 162 we can distinguish the mischief 
("a"), the statute that is the legislative act ("b"), and the purpose ("c"): "Because 
of a, b, so that c." In more detail: 
Mischief and purpose are distinct in their relation to intentional action. By 
describing the enactment of a statute as intentional action, I am not suggesting 
that interpreters should try to discern specific legislative intent. 163 But legislators 
do engage in "acts intended to make law,"164 and therefore intend their acts to ac-
complish something in the world. 165 That sense of intention is sufficient to allow 
an interpreter to distinguish mischief and purpose, each representing an aspect of 
the "reason" for the legislature's action. 
First, there is the motivating or prompting reason, the state of affairs prior to 
the action. This is the locus of the mischief. It is a in the statement: "Because of 
a .... "166 
160. Jeremy Bentham notes that a legislature might enact legislation "procuring benefits" rather than 
"suppress[ing] mischief," and he gives this example: 
Where was the mischief before the acts for the encouragement of the discovery of the 
Longitude? That the Longitude was not discovered? This seems rather harsh to say. Benefit 
is certainly a more palatable word: it were a pity to shut the door against the few occasions 
we can have to introduce it. 
BENTHAM, supra note 72, at 139. 
161. I owe this idea to a conversation with Jordan Lavender. 
162. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. 
163. Apart from the text read in context, I take it that "the intention of the legislature is 
undiscoverable in any real sense." Radin, supra note 156, at 870-71; see also FRANKFURTER, supra note 
42, at 19-20; FULLER, supra note 64, at 86-87; SEDGWICK, supra note 130, at 382-83. For a 
sophisticated recent analysis, see Doerfler, supra note 50. 
164. Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL 
POSITIVISM 249, 258 (Robert P. George ed., 1996); see also Doerfler, supra note 50, at 1024-25. 
165. This is a step beyond simply saying "that legislators intend to enact a law that will be decoded 
according to prevailing interpretive conventions." Mamring, Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra 
note 118, at 432-33; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Statutory Interpretation Muddle, 114 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 269, 314-17 (2019) ( critiquing the attribution to a legislature of only minimal intentions); Nelson, 
supra note 44, at 453-63 (same). 
166. One can soften the causal language: "In light of a, b." Or: "After a, b." 
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Second, there is the legislature's action-the statute. It responds to the motiva-
tional reason, though it may go beyond, or stop short of, fully responding to that 
motivational reason. It is bin the statement: "Because of a, b .... " 
Third, there is what might be called the telic reason. This is the end, aim, goal, 
or purpose that on some interpretive theories could be imputed to the legislature. 
It is c in the statement: "Because of a, b, so that c." The telic reason could be no 
more than a reproduction of the motivating reason; the legislature's general aim 
(if the expression may be used) could be stated as simply the mitigation of the 
prior state of affairs (that is, c could be b's cure of a). But the general aim could 
go well beyond that. 
Outside of law, it is easy to illustrate the difference: "Because of my stroke, I 
am exercising daily, so I can live a long life," or "because I failed that exam, I am 
going to study harder, so I can have the career choices I want."167 
For a statutory example, consider again the CSX cases, involving a federal stat-
ute prohibiting state taxes that discriminated against rail carriers. 168 The Court 
was required to decide whether to read the fourth provision of the statute as im-
plicitly limited to the mischief that was directly addressed in the first three provi-
sions. That mischief was the use of state property taxes to burden railroads from 
out of state, or as Justice Thomas put it, the problem was "property taxes that 
soaked the railroads."169 The purpose would be the removal of the mischief, but 
with the broader aim of ensuring a free flow of interstate commerce. 
Or consider Bond v. United States, where the Court interpreted the Chemical 
Weapons Convention Implementation Act. 17° Chief Justice Roberts made explicit 
his view of what prompted the enactment of the Convention and the statute. The 
first paragraph of his opinion for the Court describes "[t]he horrors of chemical 
warfare [as] vividly captured by John Singer Sargent in his 1919 painting 
Gassed."171 The next paragraph notes "the devastation that Sargent witnessed in 
the aftermath of the Second Battle of Arras during World War I. "172 "That battle 
and others like it," he said, "led to an overwhelming consensus in the interna-
tional community that toxic chemicals should never again be used as weapons 
against human beings. "173 The Chemical Weapons Convention was adopted, as 
its preamble says, "for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possi-
bility of the use of chemical weapons."174 These observations can be put into the 
formula suggested in this Article: "Because of the Second Battle of Arras and 
167. I owe the examples to A.J. Bellia. 
168. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. 
169. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep't of Revenue (CSX I), 562 U.S. 277, 301 (2011) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
170. 572 U.S. 844 (2014). 
171. Id. at 847. 
172. Id. at 848. 
173. Id. (emphasis added). 
174. Id. at 849 (quoting Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling 
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, pmbl., opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, 
1974 U.N.T.S. 318). 
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others like it, the Convention was adopted and the statute enacted, so that human-
ity would never again face the use of chemical weapons." 175 
In short, the action of the legislature, in its relationship to the mischief and pur-
pose, can be stated as the following: "Because of the mischief, the legislature 
enacts a statute, so that the purpose may be achieved."176 Some interpreters will 
happily seek the general purpose of the statute. Even for those of us who would 
not, the mischief is a distinct concept. Whether it is a useful concept is the ques-
tion to turn to next. 
III. Two FUNCTIONS OF THE MISCHIEF RuLE 
The mischief rule serves two functions. One is the stopping-point function; the 
other is the clever-evasion function. 177 In relation to the bare text, the first and 
more common function (stopping-point) tends to narrow the domain of the stat-
ute. The other (clever-evasion) tends to broaden it. 
A. RATIONALIZING A STOPPING POINT 
A pervasive problem in legal interpretation is determining the correct scope for 
a statutory term or provision. This is a staple of every article about "no vehicles 
in the park." Or consider another one of the hypothetical cases in the statutory 
interpretation literature: Judge Easterbrook's example of a statute that requires 
the leashing of "dogs."178 Is it the case, Easterbrook asks, that it "requires the 
leashing of cats (because the statute really covers the category 'animals') or 
wolves (because the statute really covers the category 'canines') or lions ('dan-
gerous animals')"?179 Easterbrook's point is that the reference to "dogs" provides 
an outer bound on the domain of the statute. 180 But what about the breadth prob-
lem in the other direction? Does the statute require the leashing of a robotic dog? 
An aged and blind dog carried by its owner? A police dog that is in the park but 
inside a police car? A dead dog, just hit by a car, that has been moved into the 
park while its owners are being contacted? 
175. This statement is abbreviated so as not to be unwieldy, but one could expand the statement of the 
mischief to capture the legal inadequacy: "Because of the Second Battle of Arras and others like it, and the 
legal regime that made them possible and allows such uses of chemical weapons in the future, .... " 
176. See Shobe, supra note 146, at 683 (distinguishing enacted findings and purposes). Compare 
Quentin Skinner's distinction between "motive" and "intention," with the former being the reason for 
the writer or artist to begin, but the latter being the purpose that continues into and is involved with the 
work itself. Quentin Skinner, Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts, 3 NEW LITERARY HIST. 
393, 401--02 (1972). Although Skinner's distinction is not identical with the one here, and is concerned 
not with laws as much as with poems, it is of interest that he similarly distinguishes an antecedent setting 
that motivates the creation from a continuing authorial purpose. 
177. Another function that might be elaborated is aid in choosing between two non-overlapping 
senses of a term that are ambiguous (in the technical sense, as contrasted to vagueness, see ENDICOTT, 
supra note 110, at 54). Compare Blackstone's example about provisions. Seel BLACKSTONE, supra note 
56, at 60. 
178. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 533,535 (1983). 
179. Id. 
180. Id. ("For rules about the rest of the animal kingdom we must look elsewhere."). 
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One could of course say that a dog is a dog is a dog, and the text has no qualifi-
cations about the dog needing to be biological, healthy, unrestrained, or living. 
Or one could read the statute in light of its mischief (whatever that might be), 
treating some or all of these as the kinds of barber-in-Bologna cases that are 
within the bare text but not within the mischief, and thus potentially not within 
the statute. 181 In short, the breadth problem works in both directions, and inter-
preters are constantly called upon to choose an appropriate scope for a legal term 
or prov1s10n. 
That is precisely the choice raised in the examples in the Introduction: "ani-
mals" in the stop-the-train case, 182 "discriminate" in the CSX cases, 183 "tangible 
object" in Yates, 184 "sex" in Zarda, 185 and "chemical weapons" in Bond. 186 In 
each case, the statutory text could be given a narrower reading in line with the 
mischief----or not. 
In these cases, and others, 187 the mischief rule offers a rationale for choosing a 
narrower reading. Indeed, this function of the mischief rule was widely recog-
nized by older interpreters when they insisted (1) that they had a choice about the 
scope of a statute, and (2) that in making that choice they should consider the mis-
chief to which the statute responds. As Justice Story said, where a statute "is sus-
ceptible of two interpretations, one of which satisfies the terms, and stops at the 
obvious mischief provided against, and the other goes to an extent, which may 
involve innocent parties in its penalties, it is the duty of the court to adopt the for-
mer."188 Conversely, the mischief rule might suggest the choice of a broader 
scope. Again, Justice Story: 
But where the words are general, and include various classes of persons, I 
know of no authority, which would justify the court in restricting them to one 
class, or in giving them the narrowest interpretation, where the mischief to be 
redressed by the statute is equally applicable to all of them. 189 
181. On the medieval hypothetical case of the barber in Bologna, see supra note 20 and 
accompanying text. 
182. Nashville & K. R. Co. v. Davis, 78 S.W. 1050, 1050 (Tenn. 1902). 
183. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. 
184. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
185. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text. 
186. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. 
187. E.g., N. X-Ray Co. v. State, 542 N.W.2d 733, 737-38 (N.D. 1996) (relying on the mischief to 
read narrowly the ambiguous statutory term "contractor"); State v. Smith, 25 S.C.L. (Chev.) 157, 160 
(Ct. App. 1840) (relying on the mischief to give a narrow reading to "disfiguring" in a statute about 
marking, branding, or killing animals). 
188. Prescott v. Nevers, 19 F. Cas. 1286, 1288-89 (C.C.D. Me. 1827) (No. 11,390). Although here 
the mischief rule and the rule of lenity align, for Justice Story the mischief rule had independent force. 
He applied it even when doing so meant a broader reading of a penal statute. See United States v. Winn, 
28 F. Cas. 733, 734-35 (C.C.D. Mass. 1838) (No. 16,740). But see United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 
(5 Wheat.) 76, 105 (1820) (per Marshall, C.J.) (rejecting a broad reading that relied on the mischief, 
because of the statute's structure and penal classification). On the mischief rule and penal statutes, see 
supra note 102. 
189. Winn, 28 F. Cas. at 734; see also United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 
324-25 (1897) (concluding that railroads, and not manufacturers alone, are within the Trust Act, 
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When faced with such choices, the judge should, as Reydon' s Case puts it, 
"make such ... construction as shall suppress the mischief."190 
An array of objections could be mounted-there may be disagreement about 
the mischief, there could be other canons or interpretive considerations that coun-
tenance the opposite conclusion, and so on. All true. Yet those same objections 
can be made to any aspect of interpretation. 
My argument is not that the mischief rule will mark out the One True 
Interpretation, nor even simply that it will narrow judicial discretion. 191 Nor will 
the mischief rule allow a court to correct a mistake on the part of the legislature, 
as in King v. Burwell. 192 Instead, the mischief rule is fundamentally a doctrine of 
focus and rationalization. It guides the interpreter, directing her attention, and it 
allows her to express an intuition she has about the scope of a statute. 
Although one could think of the mischief rule as a rationalization of whatever 
the interpreter thinks is good policy193-and that no doubt sometimes occurs-it 
is not the rationalization I have in mind. There is no reason to think Justice 
Thomas approved of tax-code goodies for favored Alabama firms. Or that Justice 
Ginsburg approved of the captain of a fishing vessel destroying the evidence that 
could be used against him. Or that Judge Lynch approved of Congress's failure to 
protect LGBT Americans from employment discrimination. 194 Yet they each had 
because "the evil to be remedied is similar" and the "general language [is] sufficiently broad to include 
them both"). 
190. (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637,638; 3 Co. Rep. 7 a, 7 b (Exch.). 
191. On the mischief rule and discretion, see supra note 111. On the mischief rule and predictability, 
see supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
192. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). In King v. Burwell, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) had made tax credits 
available to any taxpayer who emolled in an insurance plan through "an Exchange established by the 
State" under the Act. Id. at 2482. The Court had to decide whether the provision also included in its 
reach exchanges set up by the federal govermnent. Id. at 2483. At least one scholar has read the opinion 
of the Court as relying on the mischief addressed by the ACA. See Krishnakumar, supra note 12, at 
1340. In my view, however, the mischief rule was inapt. In King v. Burwell, the Court was not choosing 
between different degrees of breadth that the statutory phrase could bear or resolving a latent ambiguity; 
what it did was more like the correction of an error in the enacted statute. See Ryan D. Doerfler, The 
Scrivener's Error, 110 Nw. U. L. REV. 811, 843-50 (2016); see also Abbe R. Gluck, Justice Scalia' s 
Unfinished Business in Statutory Interpretation: Where Textualism' s Formalism Gave Up, 92 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 2053, 2074 (2017) (describing four words in the ACA as a "potential drafting error"). An 
additional difficulty with applying the mischief rule in the case was the sheer enormity and complexity 
of the statute, which made it hard to state the mischief with the particularity that might distinguish it 
from a general purpose. Cf Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O'Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox 
Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1792-93 (2015) (noting the ACA "is a 
2700-page statute worked on by five congressional committees; it delegates not to a single federal 
agency but to multiple federal agencies, as well as to states, quasi-public actors, and an independent 
commission, to which it outsourced the controversial question of cutting Medicare"); Shobe, supra note 
146, at 682-83 (noting that "Congress included several sets of findings throughout the [ACA]," and then 
listing some that seem indistinguishable from statements of general purpose). This difficulty is further 
considered in Part IV. 
193. Cf Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1751 (2020) ("One could also reasonably fear that 
objections about unexpected applications will not be deployed neutrally."). 
194. To the contrary, Judge Lynch said: 
Speaking solely as a citizen, I would be delighted to awake one morning and learn that 
Congress had just passed legislation adding sexual orientation to the list of grounds of 
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a strong intuition that the scope of the statute was not simply the scope of the bare 
words-that those words had to be considered in context, and that the context 
was not merely legal (that is, not merely other provisions of the statute, other stat-
utes, and background principles of law). Rather, they each had a strong intuition 
that the term had to be read in the context of the problem to which the statute was 
addressed. 195 The context helped them decide what it was that Congress had 
actually done. 196 
The mischief rule is simply how judges have traditionally expressed their intu-
ition about a stopping point for statutory language. 197 As familiarity with the mis-
chief rule has receded, the intuitions have not dissolved. They remain, as they 
likely always will. Yet some interpreters do not have such intuitions about the 
scope of these statutes. The mischief rule is not so firmly established in contem-
porary statutory interpretation, nor so conclusive, that it requires that a term or 
provision be given a certain scope. 198 
At this point, the objection might be raised that judicial intuitions about a stat-
ute's stopping point are misguided, even dangerous. The legislature has chosen 
the scope; for example, it used the word "animal" in the stop-the-train case with 
no exception for geese. 199 Why should judges make exceptions? 
This objection goes to the heart of how the mischief rule works, and more gen-
erally how context and pragmatic enrichment work. If we think most statutory 
texts are clear without looking to context, then there is reason to be concerned 
about the mischief rule. Adding considerations like the mischief will increase the 
employment discrimination prohibited under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. I am 
confident that one day-and I hope that day comes soon-I will have that pleasure. 
Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 137 (2d Cir. 2018) (Lynch, J., dissenting), aft d, 
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1731. 
195. Cf Duparquet Huot & Moneuse Co. v. Evans, 297 U.S. 216, 221 (1936) (Cardozo, J.) 
(explaining how "[the words] came there freighted with the meaning imparted to them by the mischief to 
be remedied and by contemporaneous discussion[,] [i]n such conditions history is a teacher that is not to 
be ignored." (citation omitted)). 
196. See, e.g., Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 462, 464 (1946) (discussing "the general 
problem to which the framers of the Federal Kidnapping Act addressed themselves," and concluding 
that "the broadness of the statutory language does not permit us to tear the words out of their context, 
using the magic of lexigraphy to apply them to unattractive or immoral situations lacking the 
involuntariness of seizure and detention which is the very essence of the crime of kidnaping"); Mkt. Co. 
v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112, 116 (1879) ("To understand the true meaning of the clause, it is necessary to 
observe what the subject was in regard to which Congress attempted to legislate."); SUTHERLAND, supra 
note 129, at 320 ("Legislatures, like courts, must be considered as using expressions concerning the 
thing they have in hand; and it would not be a fair method of interpretation to apply their words to 
subjects not within their consideration, and which, if thought of, would have been more particularly and 
carefully disposed of."); cf Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 
11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 59, 66 (1988) ("The novelty of a question suggests that the legislature did 
not answer it."). 
197. For a distinction between judges' linguistic intuitions and judgments, with an endorsement of 
the former, see Fallon, Jr., supra note 165, at 280-81. 
198. For an exploration of permissive interpretive rules, see generally Re, supra note 15. 
199. See Nashville & K. R. Co. v. Davis, 78 S.W. 1050, 1050 (Tenn. 1902); supra text accompanying 
note 1. 
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risk of interpretive error. Thinking of a generally worded but clear text, we will 
see the mischief rule as something that allows a judge to ride in and carve out an 
ad hoc exception. 
But legal language needs context to be understood. 200 It is true that statutory 
language is more formal than a conversation; it is not generated and used in a mi-
lieu of happy cooperation and generous implicature. 201 But statutory language is 
still language, and there remain trade-offs in how much is spelled out explicitly. 
The mischief rule can be seen as a reflection of the need for contextual enrich-
ment, a tool that developed in law and is well adapted for judicial interpretation 
of statutory language. 
Consider for example the context that is provided by "tacit domain quanti-
fiers." Although the name is technical (and the phenomenon travels under other 
names, too), the intuition is easy to grasp: 
If I were to open the fridge in search of beer and say "there is no beer," what 
you would probably understand me to be saying is that there is no beer in the 
fridge. In other words, you would take me to be tacitly restricting the domain 
of my quantifier to things in the fridge. 202 
The mischief rule encourages the interpreter to think about what was in the eye 
of the legislature, not as a means of defeating or overriding the text, but as a way 
to understand it. 203 
The stop-the-train case illustrates how the mischief rule does this.204 "Animal" 
might seem clear, but once we understand the problem precedent, the ambiguity 
of the word comes into focus, and a reasonable reader will not understand the stat-
ute as saying that trains have to stop for squirrels and slugs. Nor is the text's de-
pendence on context at all unusual. The bare words of a statute are frequently 
ambiguous without context, yet the pervasiveness of this phenomenon tends 
200. See Doerfler, supra note 50, at 991-94, 997-98, 1028-29; Green, supra note 50, at 171; see also 
Bach, supra note 5 (distinguishing semantics and pragmatics); Samuel L. Bray, "Necessary AND 
Proper" and "Cruel AND Unusual": Hendiadys in the Constitution, 102 VA. L. REV. 687, 694 (2016) 
(noting that historical context is critical for determining whether a phrase should be interpreted as a 
hendiadys); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal "Meaning" and Its Implications for Theories 
of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. Cm. L. REV. 1235, 1246-47, 1260--62, 1303 (2015) (distinguishing 
"contextual meaning" and "reasonable meaning"). 
201. See Hemy E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 1105, 1131 (2003); cf Fallon, Jr., supra note 165, at 283-97 (critiquing the use of conversational 
models for statutory interpretation). 
202. Green, supra note 50 (quoting DANIEL z. KORMAN, OBJECTS: NOTHING OUT OF THE ORDINARY 
42 (2015)). Whether such quantifiers should be classified as pragmatic is debated. See, e.g., Jason 
Stanley & Zoltan Gendler Szabo, On Quantifier Domain Restriction, 15 MIND & LANGUAGE 219, 220 
(2000). 
203. See Wald, supra note 50 ("In the context of the statute, other related statutes, or the problems 
giving rise to the statute, words may be capable of many different meanings, and the literal meaning 
may be inapplicable or nonsensical." (emphasis added)). In his dissent in Bostock, Justice Kavanaugh 
makes this same point about the absurdity doctrine. See Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1827-
28 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
204. Davis, 78 S.W. at 1050. 
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to be missed because interpreters supply the necessary context by instinct. An in-
terpreter who is reading the legislative words in their context, which includes the 
mischief, is a more faithful agent. 
Yet, as noted, knowing the mischief is not conclusive; it does not control and 
overpower the text. The meaning of some statutes is dependent on knowing the 
mischief, just as it is true of language that the meaning of some expressions is 
context dependent. But sometimes the words are so clear that the best account of 
the legislative decision is simply that it is broader or narrower than the mis-
chief.205 There is no meta rule for this. Sometimes-but only sometimes-a judge 
will be convinced that the best account of what the legislature actually decided is 
provided by the text and mischief in tandem. What the mischief rule does is direct 
the judge's attention to this possibility. 206 
As time passes and a law is pressed into service in new circumstances, the problem 
of scope will grow more pressing. The mischief rule will, accordingly, have more bite. 
At the time of a statute's enactment, a judge who considers the mischief might be just 
as likely to give the text a broader reading as a narrower one.207 Over time, however, 
the mischief rule will tend to suggest a narrower scope, a domain for the statute that 
does not broaden. The reason is that the evil is fixed at a moment in time, even while 
new circumstances constantly arise. The statute, when its words are read by an inter-
preter attentive to the mischief, will thus tend to be enmeshed in the circumstances 
existing when it was enacted. As new problems emerge, as new mischiefs multiply, 
the relative fixity of "the mischief' will mean that in some cases where the bare text 
might be taken to reach a new problem, the application of the mischief rule will keep 
the statute from "growing" to meet the new challenge. 
In this respect, the mischief rule can be compared with dynamic statutory inter-
pretation. 208 Both share a skepticism of finding within the text itself full clarity 
205. See supra note 140 (discussing Holy Trinity Church); see also Van Kleek v. O'Hanlon, 21 
N.J.L. 582, 591-92 (1845) (Carpenter, J.) (simultaneously recognizing that "[t]he mischief, the old law, 
and the remedy, are doubtless to be considered in the construction of all remedial statutes," and refusing 
to adopt a proposed interpretation because "the supposed general intention of the legislature is to be 
considered in due subservience to the actual langnage used; and the language is not to be strained to 
support such supposed intention"). 
206. Cf Brewer's Lessee v. Blougher, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 178, 198-99 (1840) (recognizing the Court's 
ability to read a statute narrowly if the Justices "are satisfied that the literal meaning of its language 
would extend to cases which the legislature never designed to embrace in it," yet declining to find any 
exception to the legislature's "general terms" because there was "no language showing any such design" 
of a narrower import). 
207. For examples of the mischief rule encouraging a broader reading, see infra Section 111.B. 
Another example is NLRB. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., where the Court chose a broader reading for 
employee-that is, reading it not as a technical term excluding independent contractors-because "[t]he 
mischief at which the Act is aimed and the remedies it offers are not confined exclusively to 'employees' 
within the traditional legal distinctions separating them from 'independent contractors."' 322 U.S. 111, 
126 (1944). Hearst Publications was probably wrong at the time given the existing legal meaning of 
employee, and at any rate Congress later amended the relevant statute's language, which essentially 
reversed the Court's interpretation in Hearst Publications. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 
U.S. 318, 324-25 (1992). 
208. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994). The 
two are not conceptually parallel. The mischief rule is a tool that can be used by interpreters holding any 
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about its scope.209 But one difference is temporal: the mischief is in the past; it is 
usually a problem that immediately preceded the enactment of the statute. 
Dynamic statutory interpretation looks to societal values in the present, a rolling 
and evolving present. One might say that dynamic statutory interpretation asks 
what society would now consider to be the mischief addressed by the statute.210 
Dynamic statutory interpretation also differs from the mischief rule in terms of 
bias with respect to the problem of scope or breadth. Present values might suggest 
taking a statute either broadly or narrowly. There is thus no intrinsic bias to 
dynamic statutory interpretation, for whether present societal values would 
suggest a broader or narrower reading is entirely contingent on the statute and on 
the intervening changes in societal values. By contrast, as noted, the mischief 
rule will more often than not suggest a narrower reading for the statute. The 
statute will simply do less: there will be more questions for which the answers do 
not lie within the statute's domain.211 
B. THWARTING CLEVER EVASIONS 
A second function of the mischief rule is the thwarting of clever evasions by 
suggesting a modestly broader scope. As Reydon' s Case puts it, the judge should 
"suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief."212 
This could be considered a subset of the first function: the court is choosing a 
scope that will thwart a clever evasion. Yet it is distinctive enough to deserve sep-
arate discussion, especially because this second function of the mischief rule 
tends to work in the opposite direction from the first-it usually supports a court's 
choice of a broader reading. 
In Ash Sheep Co. v. United States, the Court gave a modestly broader reading 
to a statute in order to prevent circumvention, and it was candid that the mischief 
was one of two decisive considerations in the case. 213 The statute said: "Every 
person who drives or otherwise conveys any stock of horses, mules, or cattle, to 
range and feed on any land belonging to any Indian or Indian tribe, without the 
consent of such tribe, is liable to a penalty of one dollar for each animal of such 
stock."214 The defendant corporation had ranged and fed sheep, and thus one 
question in the case was whether sheep came within the scope of "any stock of 
one of a number of different theories of statutory interpretation, while dynamic statutory interpretation is 
such a theory. 
209. Similar skepticism of an innate scope in the text itself can be found in canons of statutory 
interpretation that encourage "broad" or "narrow" readings of certain kinds of statutes. See, e.g., H. 
Tomas Gomez-Arostegui, What History Teaches Us About US Copyright Law and Statutory Damages, 5 
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. J. 76, 79-86 (2013) (analyzing the 1909 Copyright Act in light of one such 
canon). 
210. Dynamic statutory interpretation of course goes beyond that, also considering (especially 
considering) affinnative values. 
211. See generally Easterbook, supra note 178. 
212. (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637,638; 3 Co. Rep. 7 a, 7 b (Exch.). 
213. See 252 U.S. 159, 168 (1920). 
214. Id. at 163 (quoting U.S. REv. STAT.§ 2117 (1875)). 
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horses, mules, or cattle."215 As the Supreme Court recognized, the word cattle 
was ambiguous. 216 It could refer to cows, as distinct from sheep and other ani-
mals, but it could also be used in a broader sense to refer to livestock (including 
cows and sheep). The narrower sense was more common, the Court said. 217 
Indeed, the broader sense of livestock was sufficiently rare that the Court sug-
gested it would not give that interpretation to a newly enacted statute. 218 
Nevertheless, the Court read cattle as including sheep because the lower courts 
and the Department of Justice had accepted that broader reading for half a cen-
tury, and because "the pasturing of sheep is plainly within the mischief at which 
this section aimed."219 Although not explicitly stated, the Court apparently con-
sidered the mischief to be that tribal lands were being used for grazing without 
the tribes' consent. 220 
If the Court had allowed the grazing of sheep on the tribal lands, the statute 
could have been circumvented. Thus, the mischief rule "permits ambiguous legis-
lation to be interpreted in such a way as to suppress the mischief which it was 
designed to eliminate."221 
Other examples could be given, too. 222 In these examples, there is a recurring 
note of modesty. As Chief Justice Marshall said, in a suit in which counsel 
pointed to Reydon' s Case: 
It is the province of the legislature to declare, in explicit terms, how far the citi-
zen shall be restrained in the exercise of that power over property which own-
ership gives, and it is the province of the court to apply the rule to the case thus 
explicitly described-not to some other case which judges may conjecture to 
be equally dangerous. 223 
When courts do employ the rule to stop a clever evasion, it is not that the court 
is preventing some other mischief, but rather, as Reydon' s Case says, the target is 
215. Id. at 167. 
216. See id. at 168-69 (discussing dictionary definitions, an earlier decision of the Court on whether 
the word cattle in a letter of credit included hogs, and an Attorney General's opinion that invoked "[t]he 
standard lexicographers" on whether cattle included sheep). As Mark Greenberg and Harry Litman note, 
the Court was focused on the original meaning, not present meaning, of cattle. Mark D. Greenberg & 
Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569,593 & n.95 (1998). 
217. Ash Sheep Co., 252 U.S. at 169. 
218. See id. at 167 ("If this were a recent statute and if we were giving it a first interpretation we 
might hesitate to say that by the use of the word 'cattle' Congress intended to include 'sheep."'). 
219. Id. at 169. 
220. See id. at 167-68. 
221. JOHN BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 224 (5th ed. 2019). 
222. E.g., United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1909); Smith v. Townsend, 148 
U.S. 490, 499-501 (1893); The Emily, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 381, 388-89 (1824); Commonwealth v. Trent, 
77 S.W. 390, 392 (Ky. 1903). For a possible example that is more recent and controversial, see AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339, 355 (2011) (stating that the Federal Arbitration Act 
"was enacted in 1925 in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements," and reading 
the saving clause of the Act narrowly to prevent circumvention of the Act). 
223. Schooner Paulina's Cargo v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 52, 61 (1812) (emphasis added). 
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evasions that would allow "continuance of the mischief."224 The clever-evasion 
function is therefore not meant to allow a judicial remaking of a statute-it is the 
patching of a hole, not the rebuilding of Theseus's ship plank-by-plank. That is of 
course a matter of degree and judgment, and it requires good faith on the part of 
judges. 225 I see no way to offer a more precise definition. 
It is probably not an accident that illustrations of the clever-evasion function 
tend to be from older cases. This function of the mischief rule is out of keeping 
with current American legal culture, with its simultaneous embrace of judicial 
command and discomfort with judicial discretion. 226 
IV. THE MISCHIEF RULE AND THE AGE OF STATUTES 
The mischief rule is a creature of the common law world, not of the age of stat-
utes. 227 That origin suggests certain limits on how it should be used today. But the 
question of this difference-that is, the gap between the age of the common law 
and the age of statutes-also raises questions about whether we are truly still in 
the latter. And if not, what are the implications for the mischief rule? 
A. THE MISCHIEF RULE IN THE AGE OF STATUTES 
Although the mischief rule corresponds to a widespread intmt10n among 
judges today, it is also a product of a different time and place.228 When Reydon' s 
Case invoked the mischief, statutes were the exception and the common law was 
the norm. 229 It was therefore possible to see statutes as discrete interventions into 
a common law world. In such a world, not only were statutes thought of in rela-
tion to the common law, but even their interpretive frame was determined by 
exactly how things stood between the common law and the statute in question. 
Statutory interventions might displace the common law, and thus deserve narrow 
interpretation; or they might express or extend the common law, and thus deserve 
224. (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637,638; 3 Co. Rep. 7 a, 7 b (Exch.). 
225. Cf Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1294 (2007) (noting 
that judicial self-discipline is a matter of degree). The need for good faith in the exercise of a power, and 
the difficulty of spelling out in advance all the situations in which that power should and should not be 
used, is a familiar problem from the law of equity. See generally Hemy E. Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, 
130 YALE L.J. 1050 (2021); Hemy E. Smith, Fusing the Equitable Function in Private Law, in PRIVATE 
LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 173 (Kit Barker, Karen Fairweather & Ross Grantham eds., 2017). 
226. See Samuel L. Bray, Equity: Notes on the American Reception, in EQUITY AND LAW: FUSION 
AND FISSION 31, 32 (John C. P. Goldberg, Henry E. Smith & P. G. Turner eds., 2019). 
227. See generally Gurno CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). 
228. See supra Section I.A. 
229. Cf Radin, supra note 90, at 389 ("As long as the common law is basic, the rule of Reydon' s 
Case has much to commend it."). It is possible to exaggerate the dominance of the common law, and 
there were periods with highly significant legislation. See BAKER, supra note 221, at 220 ("King Hemy 
VIII's parliaments were prodigiously industrious, passing some 677 statutes which occupy almost as 
much space as all the preceding legislation from Magna Carta onwards."). For more on legislation in late 
medieval and early modem England, see id. at 216-20. 
1008 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JouRNAL [Vol. 109:967 
broad interpretation. 230 
The world in which Reydon' s Case expounded the mischief rule is different 
from ours in ways that affect the rule's use. In that world, there was less demand 
for courts to update statutes, not because the legislature would, but because the 
statutes themselves were less important: the law would continue to change, but in 
the way the common law did under Coke, Holt, Mansfield, and so on.231 In that 
world, a statute was more likely to have a single mischief. The breadth and array 
of mischiefs for a statute like the Affordable Care Act,232 omnibus bills, and other 
modern forms of "unorthodox lawmaking"233 were unknown. The relative nar-
rowness of the statutes in the early days of the mischief rule made it easier to 
identify a mischief. And in that world, the fallback options were better; if a stat-
ute, read narrowly to fit the mischief, did not apply, the common law would. 
Despite the imperfections of the common law, it would be more intelligible than 
the fallback options for a massive modern statute like the Affordable Care Act.234 
For all these reasons, the mischief rule fits the legal culture that produced it-a 
different legal culture from our own. That conclusion generates certain limits on 
the application of the mischief rule today. 
First, not all statutes, and not all statutory provisions, will have a mischief. 235 A 
statute might be meant not to solve a problem in the past but to create something 
affirmative and new. Or a statutory provision might act on some other part of the 
statute, and not have any independent force. 
Second, for some statutes, the mischief will be sufficiently broad and compos-
ite that it is basically indistinguishable from a general purpose. 236 
Third, some statutes create a framework for agencies (or states) to choose how 
to remedy a mischief, with flexibility to change their choices over time. 237 More 
difficult still, for applying the mischief rule, would be a case in which there was 
no agreement about what the mischief was, or even completely opposite views on 
230. Reydon' s Case notes this dichotomy and says the mischief rule applies to both kinds of statutes. 
(1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638; 3 Co. Rep. 7 a, 7 b (Exch.). The difficulties in this dichotomy have been 
recognized since the sixteenth century. See 6 BAKER, OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 
supra note 59, at 77-79. 
231. On the mischief rule in the sixteenth century, see supra Section I.A. 
232. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections ofU.S.C.). 
233. See generally Gluck et al., supra note 192. 
234. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119. That fact has overshadowed the 
repeated bouts of litigation over the ACA, raising the stakes enormously for severability analysis and the 
scope of relief. 
235. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. This was also true at the time of Reydon' s Case. 
One possibility, suggested to me by Sir John Baker, is that the change from "mischief' in Coke's 
manuscript report to "mischief and defect" in the printed report is precisely to cover this possibility. See 
Reydon' s Case, 76 Eng. Rep. at 638, 3 Co. Rep. 7 b. 
236. Cf King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015) ("A fair reading of legislation demands a fair 
understanding of the legislative plan."). On King v. Burwell, see supra note 192. 
237. See Ass'n of Cal. Ins. Cos. v. Jones, 386 P.3d 1188, 1202 (Cal. 2017) ("That the Legislature 
entrusted to the Commissioner the application of these and other statutory provisions to specific 
problems-problems the Legislature did not, and in some cases could not, anticipate-is precisely why 
enactment of section 790.10 makes sense in the broader statutory scheme."). 
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the question, with the only point of legislative concurrence being to let someone 
else decide both what the problem was and what to do about it. 
Fourth, statutes prompted by a narrow mischief may have a broad array of 
purposes. 
These limits suggest the mischief rule will not be useful for all modem statutes. 
Yet they do not give any reason to abandon the mischief rule where a statute or stat-
utory provision does indeed have a mischief. And it is worth noting how different 
the mischief rule is from some other interpretive rules rooted in the world of the 
common law. Many of those rules, such as the rule that statutes in derogation of the 
common law should be narrowly construed, attempt to yank the statute into confor-
mity with the general law. But the mischief rule is not so aggressive. It recognizes 
the independent existence of the statute and calls attention to the discontinuity 
between the statute and the preexisting body of law. Relative to the continuity 
canons, the mischief rule is a pro-disruption, pro-discontinuity influence.238 
B. THE MISCHIEF RULE AFTER THE AGE OF STATUTES 
The preceding discussion of the limited role for the mischief rule today rests 
on an assumption: the mischief rule is from the age of the common law, whereas 
we live in the age of statutes. But is it evident that we still live in such an age? 
Apart from a tax law and a coronavirus-reliefbill,239 there were no major statutes 
enacted during the Trump presidency. The last time there was a significant burst 
of legislative activity was the 111 th Congress (2009-2011 ). 240 The idea of a legis-
lating Congress-at least of the kind that produced the huge legislative achieve-
ments of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s-is receding.241 For some legislators, the 
cost-benefit analysis favors blocking legislation over passing it. And the trend 
238. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 561 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Jennings, supra note 
147, at 452. Note that some early American decisions read Reydon' s Case as instructing courts to read 
statutes in line with the common law. The font for this line of argument appears to be Chancellor Kent, 
who cites H eydon' s Case within an argument that statutes should be interpreted with reference to the 
common law. 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 434 (1826); cf Karen M. Gebbia-
Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation, Democratic Legitimacy and Legal-System Values, 21 SETON HALL 
LEGIS. J. 233, 259-60 (1997) ("[T]he well-known 'mischief' rule approached statutes from a common 
law perspective, urging courts to construe statutes as, essentially, gap-filling devices designed to 
alleviate harms not adequately addressed by the common law."). On Chancellor Kent's interpretation of 
statutes, see Farah Peterson, Interpretation as Statecraft: Chancellor Kent and the Collaborative Era of 
American Statutory Interpretation, 77 MD. L. REv. 712, 732-48 (2018). 
239. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 
(2020) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-
97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (codified as amended in scattered sections ofU.S.C.). 
240. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of U.S.C.); see also Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 
2065, 2077-78 (2013) (listing the 111th Congress's accomplishments). 
241. A note of caution about my argument is provided by Judge Friendly's lecture decrying 
"legislative paralysis"-in 1963. See Hemy J. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and 
Legislators Who Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787, 797 (1963), reprinted in HENRY J. FRIENDLY, 
BENCHMARKS 41, 53 (1967). 
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may pick up speed, as the loss of legislative expertise by attrition is reinforced by 
attraction: what draws new members to the House and Senate does not seem to be 
the craft of legislating. 
Instead of asking how the mischief rule should operate in an age of statutes, it 
may be more apt to ask how it should work when Congress is enacting fewer stat-
utes, especially if this new state proves enduring. The answer is twofold, for 
courts and agencies. 
For courts, one logical way to respond is with aggressive dynamic interpreta-
tion. In the absence of new legislation, maybe judges should simply make each 
federal statute do more. Yet inaction by Congress has the effect of reinforcing the 
textualist critique of dynamic statutory interpretation.242 No longer is there any 
pretense that Congress and the courts are cooperating, and we are left with the na-
ked lawmaking of the federal courts----courts that may have increasing political 
volatility. Moreover, the longer the statutory drought continues, the harder it is to 
defend an aggressive dynamic response. Over time, it will become increasingly 
illogical and inefficient to fit all the new developments into the cubbyholes of old 
federal statutes. Statutes do not merely consist of individual terms that can be 
dialed up or down-terms like "discrimination" (CSX), "tangible object" (Yates), 
and "sex" (Zarda). 243 They set up complex institutional arrangements that cannot 
be neatly updated and yet are just as likely to be obsolete. 
The alternative may seem counterintuitive: just at the moment in which there 
are fewer new federal statutes, we could emphasize the limited domain of each 
one. But this, too, is an intelligible response. As the federal statutes gray, we 
could candidly admit their limitations. The statutes addressed particular prob-
lems; they were not delegations, increasingly remote from us, to authorize unima-
gined solutions for unimagined problems. 244 
If we do not try to shoehorn legal change into old federal statutes, we can turn 
to other engines of legal development. One is more frank development of the 
common law, which is the background against which statutes operate. 245 Another 
is increased scope for state legislation. Each of these has its own weaknesses, 
including federal judges being out of practice on the former, and the fragmenta-
tion and political polarization attending the latter. But neither of these engines of 
legal development is hobbled by the structures of the old statutes. And perhaps, in 
time, the need for federal legislation will bring a change in Congress. 
242. See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1836-37 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
243. See supra notes 23-35 and accompanying text. 
244. See Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1725-26 (2017); cf Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 349, 361 (1992) ("A problem neither 
appreciated nor discussed is not resolved; texts do not settle disputes their authors and their 
contemporary readers could not imagine."); Easterbrook, supra note 178, at 544 (suggesting that apart 
from so-called common law statutes "the domain of the statute should be restricted to cases anticipated 
by its framers and expressly resolved in the legislative process"). 
245. Cf GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 96 (1977) ("Eventually the problem of 
obsolescent statutes solves itself .... With luck, the statute will tum out to have nothing to say that is 
relevant to the new issues, which can then be decided on their own merits."). 
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The other institution is federal agencies. They already exercise ample lawmak-
ing authority, and they are more suited to this role, in terms of expertise, than 
courts are. But there is unease among the Justices about the extent of the existing 
delegations,246 and one place that judicial unease might emerge is if the Supreme 
Court strongly endorses the "major questions" doctrine. That doctrine posits that 
Congress can leave minor questions to agencies, not major questions, unless the 
statute says so explicitly. 247 
The relevance of the major questions doctrine is not just that it could keep 
agencies from filling the void left by Congress. More interestingly, the major 
questions doctrine has an essential similarity with the mischief rule. Both instruct 
that a legal enactment is not integrated and complete in itself. Rather, it must be 
set against something else. Just as we need to know the mischief to which the stat-
ute responds, so too we need to know something about the question or topic to 
which the agency's rule is responding-how big is it? And both the mischief rule 
and the major questions doctrine are interpretive intuitions that are widespread, 
even without a definitive contemporary formulation. 
This sense of a law's responsiveness to a preexisting question or problem is 
shared by what is sometimes called "the no elephants-in-mouseholes canon."248 
That is, Congress "does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme 
in vague terms or ancillary provisions-it does not, one might say, hide elephants 
in mouseholes."249 This canon, or "convention[] of expression,"250 makes the 
same kind of move that the mischief rule does: it asks us to consider the object of 
attention. 251 If Congress was contemplating a mousehole, we should not presume 
246. See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (narrowly retaining but limiting Auer 
deference); Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) (narrowly rejecting a nondelegation 
challenge to the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act). 
247. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) ("In extraordinary 
cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such an 
implicit delegation."); ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 154, at 288. The contours and terminology, and even 
the existence, of this doctrine are not beyond dispute, as seen in the opinions of Judges Brown, 
Kavanaugh, and Srinivasan in United States Telecom Ass' n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 383,402, 419 (D.C. 
Cir. 2017). 
248. See ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 154, at 339 (calling this canon "a half-sibling to the major 
questions canon"). In a precursor to Bostock, one judge analyzed the question in terms of the no 
elephants-in-mouseholes canon. See Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Co., 915 F.3d 328, 336 (5th Cir. 2019) (Ho, 
J., concurring). 
249. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). This vivid expression is Justice 
Scalia's, but note the tension with his "general-terms canon." See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
That putative canon says that general terms are not to be limited; this one limits vague terms. Even 
Justice Scalia could not quite keep the canons from dueling. 
250. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 274 (2006). 
251. See, e.g., id. at 269-70; Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 462-64 (1946). On the mischief 
being in the sight of Congress, see supra text accompanying note 139. The no elephants-in-mouseholes 
canon could be adapted to the example of tacit domain quantifiers given. See supra note 202 and 
accompanying text. It would be odd for a speaker to make a statement about there being no beer in the 
universe (an elephant of a statement) upon the occasion of looking into a refrigerator (a mousehole of an 
object of attention). Other canons can also be thought of as recognizing tacit domain quantifiers, such as 
the canon against extraterritorial application. 
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it was stuffed with an elephant. But how do we know whether Congress was con-
templating a hole the size of a mouse or the size of an elephant? That is a question 
about something that lies outside the statute, part of the statute's context and 
setting.252 
To date, much of the literature on the major questions doctrine and the no ele-
phants-in-mouseholes canon has, understandably, been focused on administrative 
law and the relationship of courts and agencies.253 But these are bespoke versions 
of a basic point about the interpretation of statutes: statutes should be interpreted 
not merely as texts, nor merely as texts set among other texts (though they are), 
but as texts that occur in a time and place. It is in the nature of laws that they tran-
scend their time and place of origin. Taxes that discriminate against railroads 
could take unimagined forms; the Sarbanes-Oxley Act254 regulates more than just 
Emon 2.0; our understanding of what it means to discriminate on the basis of sex 
is undeniably broader now than in 1964. The tension between this transcendence 
and particularity is what makes legal interpretation hard. Yet this is a moment in 
which a number of highly influential theories of interpretation are downplaying 
particularity, trying to sever the meaning of a legal enactment from its setting.255 
The mischief rule calls us back to the particularity of a legal rule, its respon-
siveness to something beyond itself, its situatedness. 256 Something similar is done 
by the major questions doctrine and the no elephants-in-mouseholes canon. All of 
these doctrines remind us that, as Justice Holmes put it, "we ask, not what this 
man meant, but what those words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker 
of English, using them in the circumstances in which they were used."257 
252. It might be deduced from the statute itself, with a judge's knowledge of the world, but the same 
is true of the mischief. See supra Section 11.B ( describing how the mischief might be identified). 
253. See generally Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Short-Circuiting the New Major Questions 
Doctrine, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 147 (2017) (discussing the major questions doctrine in the context 
of Chevron deference); Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, 70 VAND. L. 
REV. 777 (2017) (arguing that the Supreme Court alone should apply the major questions doctrine); 
Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 19 (2010) 
(connecting the no elephants-in-mouseholes doctrine to the nondelegation doctrine); Jonas J. Monast, 
Major Questions About the Major Questions Doctrine, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 445 (2016) (discussing the 
major questions doctrine and comparing it to Chevron analysis). 
254. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of U.S.C.) 
255. Examples include Justice Scalia' s rejection of the mischief rule as inconsistent with textualism, 
see supra Section I.D; Jack Balkin's move to separate out "original expected applications," see JACK M. 
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 7 (2011); and Larry Solum's centering of the distinction between 
interpretation and construction, see Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 
27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 95-96 (2010). For recognition of this in the latter case, see Frederick Schauer, 
Constructing Interpretation, 101 B.U. L. REv. 103, 122 (2021) ("[W]hat lies at the heart of the 
distinction between interpretation and construction is the idea that the meaning of language can (and 
must) be divorced from the implications, and especially the normative implications, of that language on 
a particular occasion."). 
256. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 860 (2014) (noting "the context from which the 
statute arose-a treaty about chemical warfare and terrorism"). 
257. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REv. 417, 417-18 
(1899) (emphasis added). 
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CONCLUSION 
The mischief rule is familiar yet foreign. The term is widely known, yet it is 
considered to simply be an older vocabulary for purposivism. The concept is 
more interesting than that, however, and it speaks to present interpretive disputes. 
The mischief rule does not neatly fit in the current interpretive landscape. It 
does not conform to a Scalia-style textualism. It does not generate the broader 
purpose so important to Hart-and-Sacks-style purposivism. It is out of step with 
dynamic statutory interpretation, which looks to the values of the present, not the 
mischiefs of the past. Yet the mischief rule still has something to offer to a wide 
array of interpreters. It can be used with a good conscience even by a textualist. 258 
It reflects a widespread intuition of interpreters, legal and otherwise. 259 
The mischief rule itself does not determine the meaning an interpreter should 
give to a legal text. Perhaps there is dispute about the mischief. Perhaps the mis-
chief rule points toward one reading, while other canons of interpretation point 
toward some other reading. Knowing the mischief does not tell the interpreter 
how intensively the statute addresses it.260 The rule does not contain within itself 
any formula for the resolution of such disagreement among interpretive consider-
ations. What the mischief rule offers is guidance rather than determination. 
But that guidance is useful. It is inherent in language that sometimes the mean-
ing of an expression depends on the context in which the expression appears, not 
only the textual context but also the temporal context. Sometimes, to give a faith-
ful account of the legislative decision, an interpreter needs to know what the 
legislature said, and also what the legislature said it about. 
258. Nor does it need to be regarded as merely one of "textualism's exceptions." See Jolm C. Nagle, 
Textualism's Exceptions, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, 2002, at 1-2 (discussing exceptions that 
textualists have admitted in which the statutory text is not "the end of the interpretive inquiry"). 
259. Cf PEGGY PARISH, AMELIA BEDELIA (1963) (recounting the eponymous character's mistaken 
interpretation of instructions, such as "[c]hange the towels" and "[d]raw the drapes," usually because 
she fails to understand the mischief). 
260. Cf Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987) (per curiam) ("[N]o legislation 
pursues its purposes at all costs."); Mamring, supra note 40, at 104 ("Legislators may compromise on a 
statute that does not fully address a perceived mischief, accepting half a loaf to facilitate a law's 
enactment."). 

